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ABSTRACT 





In the background of economic globalization and regional integration, due to the 
internal complementarities of China, he Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan, the 
economic interdependence among the three countries is increasingly deepening. The 
growing trilateral interdependence prompted the three governments to hold the 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting since 1999 within the framework of the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) plus China, the ROK and Japan 
(10+3) Summit. With the impetus of the trilateral summit meeting, many achievements 
were reached, especially in the field of economic and institutional construction, and all 
of which delivered tangible benefits not only to the peoples of the three countries but 
also to the region. 
 
However, there are many influential factors on the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. 
Historical, political and security issues significantly influence the three countries’ 
interests, thus the trilateral summit meeting would be affected whenever these issues 
were highlighted. After the fifth China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting held in 2012, the 
trilateral summit meeting was suspended, with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s 
visit to the Yasukuni Shrine in 2013 being one of the main reasons. Japan’s historical 
revisionism, especially Japan’s attitude and behavior on historical issues, hampered the 
further development of the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
China has attached much importance to the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting, and 
has actively supported each trilateral summit meeting. China has made great efforts for 
the resumption of the trilateral summit meeting. China has repeatedly called for Japan 
to change its attitude and take the responsible attitude regarding historical issues. 
Meanwhile China has made joint efforts with the ROK and other related parties to 
maintain peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and has been promoting the 
security mechanism construction in Northeast Asia to create a favorable environment 
for the trilateral summit meeting. As a regional power and growing international power 
relying on its unique advantage, China has the ability to play a significant role on 
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A. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
In 1999, China, the Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan held the first the 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting within the framework of the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Plus China, ROK and Japan (10+3) Summit in the 
Philippines. From 2008, the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting was separated from 
10+3 as an independent trilateral mechanism. After fifteen years of development, the 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting had resulted in numerous achievements for the 
three countries and delivered tangible benefits not only to the peoples but also to the 
entire region. 
 
However, due to historical, political and security reasons, the China-ROK-Japan 
Summit Meeting has ceased since 2012. Japan’s historical revisionism ignited 
opposition of China and the ROK, and Japan’s attitude and behavior on historical 
issues, especially Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine 
directly led to the suspension of the trilateral summit meeting and has hampered the 
further development of the trilateral summit meeting. Currently, the political relations 
among the three countries are very delicate, and in short term, the prospect of the 
resumption of the trilateral summit meeting is very bleak. Overcoming the obstacles 
and difficulties in reopening the trilateral summit meeting, and maintaining the latter 
as an effective institution remains a big issue for the three countries. 
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The trilateral cooperation corresponds with the trend of globalization and regional 
integration, as the top-level driver of the trilateral cooperation, the China-ROK-Japan 
Summit Meeting plays a significant role, and benefits the interests of the three 
countries, of course including China. It is necessary to resume the trilateral summit 
meeting, which is the key to furthering trilateral cooperation. As an important member 
in the mechanism of the trilateral summit meeting, China’s position affects the future 
development of the trilateral summit meeting. As a regional power and growing 
international power, relying on its unique advantage, China has the ability to play a 
significant role in promoting the trilateral summit meeting as a viable institution in the 
future. 
 
The author has tried to find the approaches to extricate the China-ROK-Japan Summit 
Meeting from the current predicament and open a new prospect by analyzing the 
history, significance, achievements and the reason of current obstacles and difficulties 
of the trilateral summit meeting, including its historical, political and security impacts. 
For the above purpose, the author made a research study on the topic of “China’s 
Position on the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting”. 
 
B. THEORY OF THE RESEARCH 
The theories used by the research are international political economic theory, 
international politics theory, and international relations theory, of which the core 
research theory is interdependence theory in international relations. Both the history 
and reality of the trilateral summit meeting could be explained by the interdependence 
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theory. The growing economic interdependence among China, the ROK and Japan 
prompted the three governments to hold the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting in the 
background of globalization, and the original driving force of the trilateral summit 
meeting is the growing economic interdependence. Therefore the rise and development 
of the trilateral summit meeting could be explained by the interdependence theory. 
According to the theory, the main characteristic of interdependence is “sensitivity” and 
“vulnerability”. The reasons of the current predicament of the trilateral summit 
meeting could also be found by the interdependence theory. 
 
C. RESEARCH METHOD 
The research methods used in this thesis are multiple, including diachronic study, 
comparison study, case study, and documents analysis. All the methods used are 
targeted to answer the research questions. The conclusions are reached through the 
research study and also from the author’s perspective as well. The related data and 
other information are mainly from the trilateral summit meeting record, economic data, 
bilateral and trilateral relations, and political documents of the three countries. All the 
statistics database of authority including books, journals, and articles are from 
reputable academic sources. Most data is cited from government documents and 
official websites. All data and information are considered reliable and trustworthy. 
 
D. THESIS STRUCTURE 
This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter I introduces the aim of the research, 
the structure and the research method of the thesis. Chapter II analyzes the relationship 
between deepening economic interdependence and the rise and development of the 
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China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. Chapter III explains why the three countries are 
unable to develop the trilateral summit meeting as a viable institution with concrete 
facts and events. Chapter IV explains China’s position on the trilateral summit 
meeting. Chapter V is trying to draw conclusions which states how the summit meeting 
could survive and develop as a trilateral institution for cooperation and coordination. 
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II. TRILATERAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF CHINA-ROK-JAPAN AND THE 
RISE OF THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING 
 
 
A. INTERDEPENDENCE THEORY 
a. Definition of Interdependence 
Interdependence is one of the most important concepts of international political 
economy and international relations. The viewpoint of interdependence can be found in 
the writings of Niccolo Machiavelli, 1 Charles-Louis De Montesquieu, 2 Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, 3 Adam Smith, 4 and Karl Marx. 5 However, interdependence is difficult to be 
defined. There was a long and intense debate on the definition of interdependence in 
international political economy and international relations during the last decade. 
Modern scholars, such as Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, 6 Stanley H. Hoffman, 7 
Albert O. Hirschman, 8 Richard N. Cooper, 9 and Kenneth N. Waltz 10 have explained 
interdependence by their own points of view. 
                                                        
1 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005). 
2 Charles-Louis De Montesquieu, The Spirit of Laws (London: P. Dodesley, 1794). 
3 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and the First and Second Discourses 
(Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2002). 
4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations 
(Chicago: University Of Chicago Press, 1977). 
5  Karl Marx and Frederich Engels, The Communist Manifesto (New York: 
International Publishers, 1948). 
6 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (London: 
Longman, 2000). 
7 Stanley H. Hoffman, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965). 
8 Albert O. Hirschman, National Power and the Structure of Foreign Trade (Berkeley: 
University Of California, 1945). 
9 Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the 
Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1968). 




Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye pointed out that, “In common parlance, 
dependence means a state of being determined or significantly affected by external 
force. Interdependence, most simply defined, means mutual dependence. 
Interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal 
effects among countries or among actors in different countries.” 11 
 
The standpoint of Stanley H. Hoffman is that, interdependence means mutual 
permeability of community, and mutual relationship among policies of different 
countries in international economy. Interdependence is not only a kind of condition, 
but also a kind of process, and it is not a goal, but it provides both limits and 
opportunities to the benefits and goals of countries. 12 
 
David A. Baldwin defined dependence 13  from two sides: “On the one hand, 
‘dependence’ is used in a causal sense to refer to situations in which an effect is 
contingent on or conditioned by something else. On the other hand, ‘dependence’ is 
also used to refer to a relationship of subordination in which one thing is supported by 
something else or must rely upon something else for fulfillment of a need.” 14 
 
                                                        
11 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (London: 
Longman, 2000). 
12 Stanley H. Hoffman, The State of War: Essays on the Theory and Practice of 
International Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1965); Stanley H. Hoffman, ed., 
Contemporary Theory in International Relations (Englewood Cliffs N. J.: 
Prentice-Hall, 1960). 
13 Dependence here means the same as interdependence along with other scholars. 
14  David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual Analysis,” 
International Organization 4 (1980): 471-506. 
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Generally, interdependence is regarded as the fundamental characteristic of modern 
international system. 15  Interdependence describes the relationship of mutually 
dependency between a group member and other members. In an interdependent 
relationship, the participating members are emotionally, economically, ecologically or 
morally dependent on and responsible to the others. An interdependent relationship can 
occur between two or more cooperative autonomous participants. 
 
These diverse explanations and arguments of different scholars made great 
contribution to the development of the interdependence theory. 
 
b. Contents of Interdependence Theory 
Interdependence theory was sparkled in Richard N. Cooper’s book “The Economics of 
Interdependence: Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community”. Cooper explicitly 
pointed out that interdependence was a strong trend in industrialized countries in the 
1960s, and its emergence and development was a prominent change in the post-war 
international relations. 16 
 
Interdependence theory was developed in 1970s when the world structure had been 
significantly changed. First, the bipolar structure of the United States of America (US) 
and the Soviet Union (USSR) eased up, and the exchanges and cooperation between 
the Two Camps 17 were increasing. Second, the influence of US economic supremacy 
                                                        
15 Kalevi J. Holsti, International Politics: A Framework for Analysis (New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall, 1994). 
16 Richard N. Cooper, The Economics of Interdependence: Economic Policy in the 
Atlantic Community (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co, 1968). 
17 Two Camps: Means the US and the Soviet Union 
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was declining, and European and Japanese economies were growing rapidly. Third, 
economic ties among countries continuously strengthened, and opening to the outside 
became dominant choice in international relations. Fourth, the multilateral cooperative 
mechanism and international organizations become more active and played more 
important roles on international stage. 18 
 
Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye emphasized that sensitivity and vulnerability 
was fundamental characteristic of interdependence. The affected and restrictive 
relationship of interdependence can be symmetrical or asymmetrical, and it depends on 
the extent of the sensitivity and vulnerability of the role to external circumstance. 19 
Raymond D. Duvall also pointed out that the two basic meanings of dependence 
correspond to the distinction that is often made between sensitivity interdependence 
and vulnerability interdependence. 20 
 
Interdependence theory includes the following concepts: First, the relationship 
between countries is sensitive and can easily be destroyed, especially in the nuclear 
age. Second, many problems, such as energy resources, population, environment, food, 
disarmament and development have become global issues, which are unlikely to be 
solved solely by a single country. Third, countries can no longer be isolated. More and 
more countries have adopted the policy of opening to the outside world. Last but not 
                                                        
18  Yongming Fan, Western International Political Economics, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: 
Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2006). 
19 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (London: 
Longman, 2000). 
20  Raymond D. Duvall, “Dependence and Dependencia Theory: Notes toward 
Precision of Concept and Argument,” International Organization 1 (1978): 51-78. 
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least, along with the growing balance of powers, international cooperation, instead of 
military force, has gradually become the main trend in settling international disputes. 21 
 
In the process of the development of interdependence, the latter was originally 
conceived from economic interdependence, then expanded to military, social, political, 
and ecological interdependence, until today’s concept of interdependence as 
globalization and regional integration. Richard N. Cooper emphasized that the study of 
inter-country relations, especially economic relations are the key to understanding the 
sensitive reaction relationship between a country’s economic development and 
international economic development. 22  Directly related to national interests, the 
economic interdependence is still the most important part of interdependence theory. 
 
B. INTERDEPENDENCE PUSHED BY ECONOMIC FACTORS 
China, the ROK and Japan are the most important countries in Northeast Asia, and to 
an extent in East Asia. In a macroscopic view, trilateral interdependence among China, 
the ROK and Japan is rooted from geographical location, historical relationships, 
cultural exchanges and political, security, and diplomatic factors. However, as a matter 
of fact, the original motive power of the trilateral interdependence among China, the 
ROK and Japan was economic consideration, which was also the inherent basis of 
regionalism. 
 
                                                        
21 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, 3rd ed. (London: 
Longman, 2000); David A. Baldwin, “Interdependence and Power: A Conceptual 
Analysis,” International Organization 4 (1980): 471-506. 
22  Richard N. Cooper, “Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy in the 
Seventies,” World Politics 2 (1972): 159-181. 
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a. Economic Scale of China, the ROK and Japan 
The total economic scale of China, the ROK and Japan is remarkably large. As major 
countries in East Asia, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of China, the ROK and 
Japan ranked the second, the fourteenth, and the third respectively in 2013, 23 and 
China, the ROK and Japan’s total economic aggregate accounts for 90% of East Asia, 
20% of the world; China, the ROK and Japan’s total trade volume accounts for 70% of 
East Asia, 20% of the world. 24 These three countries are playing more and more 
important roles in international economy. 
 
Table 1 - Ratio of China, the ROK and Japan’s GDP to Other Economies’ (1998) 25 




GDP (Billions of US Dollars) 1,019 376 3,915 5,311 
World Ranking 7th 15th 2nd  
Percentage Share of the World (30,431) 3.4% 1.2% 12.9% 17.5% 
Percentage Share of Asia (7,385) 13.8% 5.1% 53.0% 71.9% 
Compared to ASEAN (473) 215.4% 79.5% 827.7% 1,122.8% 
Compared to US (9,089) 11.2% 4.1% 43.1% 58.4% 
Compared to EU(15) (8,745) 11.7% 4.3% 44.8% 60.7% 
Compared to GER-FRA-UK (5,125) 19.9% 7.3% 76.4% 103.6% 
 
Through review of historical data, the economic aggregate of China, the ROK and 
Japan already had a large scale in 1998. As shown in the table 1, the GDP of China, the 
ROK and Japan ranked the senventh, the fifteenth and the second respectively in the 
world. 26 The total GDP of China, the ROK and Japan amounted to 5,311 billion US 
                                                        
23 World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product Ranking Table (2013),” Data Catalog, online, 
The World Bank, 5 Sep. 2014. 
24  China General Chamber of Commerce, China-Japan-South Korea Cooperation 
Research Report, online, China General Chamber of Commerce, 29 Aug. 2013. 
25 World Bank, “Economy and Growth,” World Development Indicators 1999, World 
Bank Publications, online, The World Bank, 1999. 
26 World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product Ranking Table (1998),” Data Catalog, online, 
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dollars, which accounted for 17.5% of the world, and 71.9% of Asia. Compared with 
other economies, the total GDP of China, the ROK and Japan accounted for 58.4% of 
the US, 60.7% of the EU(15) 27, 103.6% of the sum of Germany, France, and the 
United Kingdom (GER-FRA-UK), which were the core members of the European 
Union (EU), and 1122.8% of ASEAN. 
 
Table 2 - Ratio of China, the ROK and Japan’s Foreign Trade to Other 
Economies’ (1998) 28 




Foreign Trade (Billions of US Dollars) 324 226 668 1,218 
World Ranking 10th 14th 3rd  
Percentage Share of the World (11,186) 2.9% 2.0% 6.0% 10.9% 
Percentage Share of Asia (2,699) 12.0% 8.4% 24.8% 45.1% 
Compared to ASEAN (618) 52.4% 36.5% 108.1% 197.0% 
Compared to US (1,626) 19.9% 13.9% 41.1% 74.9% 
Compared to EU(15) (4,384) 7.4% 5.1% 15.2% 27.8% 
Compared to GER-FRA-UK (2,239) 14.5% 10.1% 29.9% 54.4% 
 
The foreign trade of China, the ROK and Japan in 1998 already represented a large 
portion of the world foreign trade. As shown in the table 2, the foreign trade volume of 
China, the ROK and Japan globally ranked the tenth, the fourteenth and the third 
respectively. The total foreign trade volume of China, the ROK and Japan reached 
1,218 billion US dollars, which accounted for 10.9% of the world, 45.1% of Asia. 
Compared to other economies, the total foreign trade volume of China, the ROK and 
                                                                                                                                                                            
The World Bank, 5 Sep. 2014. 
27 EU(15): Germany, France, United Kingdom, Italy, Spain, Netherlands, Sweden, 
Belgium, Austria, Denmark, Greece, Finland, Portugal, Ireland, Luxembourg. 
28 World Trade Organization, “Trade: Merchandise Trade (1998),” International Trade 
and Market Access Data, online, WTO, 5 Sep. 2014. 
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Japan accounted for 74.9% of the US, 27.8% of the EU(15), 54.4% of GER-FRA-UK, 
and 197.0% of ASEAN. 
 
In 1998, the huge GDP scale and foreign trade of China, the ROK and Japan defined 
the three countries’ valuable position in the world economy. Compared with other 
Asian countries, China, the ROK and Japan’s trilateral cooperation had deeper 
meanings, stronger possibilities and practical significance. 
 
b. Complementary Factor Endowments of China, the ROK and Japan 
The factor endowments of China, the ROK and Japan are highly complementary, such 
as in natural resources, labor resources, science and technology fields and in terms of 
industrial structure. The advantages of China, the ROK and Japan’s manufacturing 
industries are different. China holds low labor cost, high productivities and huge 
consumption needs. Thus, its comparative advantages are concentrated in 
labor-intensive industry and manufacturing industry, such as textiles and electronics. 
In contrast, the ROK and Japan have much more expensive labor; however, their 
technological abilities and research and development (R&D) capabilities are much 
stronger, which offers them comparative advantages in capital-intensive and 
technology-intensive industries, such as electronics and petrochemicals for the ROK, 
automobiles and machinery for Japan. According to the analysis of the Factor 
Endowment Theory 29, the potential advantages of China, the ROK and Japan are 
highly complementary. 
                                                        
29 Eli F. Heckscher, “The Effect of Foreign Trade on the Distribution of Income,” 
Ekonomisk Tidskrift 2 (1919):1-32; Bertil G. Ohlin, Interregional and International 
Trade (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1933). 
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The Trade Competitive Index (TCn) = (En - In) / (En + In) 
 
The Trade Competitive Index (TC) is an important tool in analyzing the international 
competitiveness, 30 which equals the net foreign trade of a product divided by the sum 
of foreign trade as shown above. TCn means the trade competitiveness of product N. 
En and In mean the export and import of product N. The numerical value of TCn is 
between -1 and 1. The larger the TCn is, the greater the comparative advantage and the 
stronger the competitiveness of product N shall be. 
 
Table 3 - Trade Competitive Index of China, the ROK and Japan (1992-2007) 31 
  1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2007 
High
-tech 
China -0.368 -0.371 -0.196 -0.048 -0.050 -0.055 -0.012 0.078 0.122 
ROK 0.024 0.069 0.060 0.319 0.214 0.258 0.313 0.327 0.336 
Japan 0.713 0.669 0.525 0.544 0.501 0.480 0.486 0.465 0.480 
Med-
tech 
China -0.304 -0.251 -0.186 -0.120 -0.205 -0.219 -0.155 0.015 0.047 
ROK -0.086 -0.099 -0.145 0.183 0.033 -0.009 0.010 0.017 -0.004 
Japan 0.143 0.147 0.126 0.184 0.153 0.186 0.178 0.174 0.222 
Low-
tech 
China 0.420 0.462 0.381 0.446 0.307 0.386 0.318 0.299 0.311 
ROK 0.073 0.016 -0.110 0.104 -0.131 -0.185 -0.279 -0.382 -0.385 
Japan -0.717 -0.727 -0.777 -0.735 -0.788 -0.782 -0.803 -0.824 -0.793 
 
According to the “Standard International Trade Classification” 32 , manufacturing 
industry can be divided into high-tech 33, med-tech 34 and low-tech 35. As shown in the 
                                                        
30 Robert C. Feenstra, ed., Empirical Methods for International Trade (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1988); Henry K. Kierzkowski, ed., Monopolistic Competition and 
International Trade (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 
31 United Nations Statistics Division, “Metadata and Reference: Commodity List,” 
United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database, online, UN Comtrade, 5 Sep. 
2014. 
32 Department of Economic and Social Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat, 
 14 
table 3, China has strong competitiveness in manufacturing industries with med-tech 
and low-tech, while the ROK and Japan have that with high-tech and med-tech. 
Although China, the ROK and Japan’s industrial structures have been optimized and 
the international competitiveness of China in high-tech industries has been improved 
during the past fifteen years, there was stilla big gap between China and the ROK, 
Japan. 
 
Wage level is an important indicator of labor costs. There are big differences between 
the wages of China, the ROK and Japan in manufacturing industry. As shown in table 
4, in 1995, the wages of the ROK and Japan were 28 and 58 times higher than that of 
China. In 2000, there were 15 times and 30 times that of China. In 2008, there were 8.5 
times and 10 times that of China. The table shows that: compared with the ROK and 
Japan, China had strong competitiveness in labor cost. Although compared with other 
Asian countries, China’s labor cost is not the lowest, China had more skilled labor 
force, more convenient transportation, better infrastructure and better government 
capability. China held the most attractive factor endowments for the ROK and Japan. 
                                                                                                                                                                            
Standard International Trade Classification, 4th rev. (New York: United Nations 
Publication, 2006). 
33  High-Tech Manufacturing Industry: Telecommunications, Transport Equipment, 
Electrical Machinery, Instruments and Apparatus, Office and Culture Machines, 
General Industrial Machinery and Equipment, Machinery Specialized for Particular 
Industries. 
34  Med-tech Manufacturing Industry: Iron and Steel, Non-Ferrous Metals, 
Manufactures of Metals, Non-Metallic Mineral Manufactures, Chemicals and Related 
Products, Plastics, Crude Rubber and Rubber Manufactures, Chemical Fibers, Pulp and 
Paper Manufactures, Medicinal and Pharmaceutical Products. 
35  Low-tech Manufacturing Industry: Footwear and Miscellaneous Manufactured 
Articles, Petroleum and Petroleum Products, Furniture, Articles of Apparel and 
Clothing Accessories, Beverages, Wood and Wood Manufactures, Leather and Leather 
Manufactures, Tobacco and Tobacco Manufactures, Textile and Related Products, 
Printing Products. 
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Thus the factor endowments of China, the ROK and Japan were highly complementary, 
and there was great potential and bright vision for the trilateral cooperation. 
 
Table 4 - Wages in Manufacturing of China, the ROK and Japan and other 
Economies (1990-2008) 36 
(Per Month, US Dollars) 
 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
China 36.0 51.6 88.1 160.5 290.2 
ROK 834.2 1460.3 1386.1 2327.8 2469.8 
Japan 2431.0 2979.7 2711.1 2637.6 2847.3 
US 1767.4 2058.4 2271.2 2696.0 2895.2 
Canada 2406.9 2851.0 3179.2 3581.6 3789.5 
United Kingdom 1600.0 1894.0 2508.2 3683.2 4324.0 
Singapore 785.1 1525.1 1755.9 2096.6 2797.1 
Thailand 131.1 200.5 144.3 158.5 216.9 
India 56.3 37.2 28.4 28.0 78.1 
Philippines   166.3 236.0 345.5 
Vietnam   55.1 70.4 96.0 
Indonesia   67.9 57.6 89.5 
 
c. Complementary Economic Structures of China, the ROK and Japan 
Each one of China, the ROK and Japan has a huge GDP and foreign trade volume, 
because the ways of economic development for the three countries are different, their 
economic structures are highly complementary. 
 
Firstly, China’s economic structure is complementary with that of the ROK and Japan. 
Since the market economy system was established in China, China’s export and import 
expanded constantly, and China’s economy gradually shew characteristics of an 
export-oriented economy. Because China has implemented long-term planned 
economic system before, it had strong ability for self-sufficiency on its own resources. 
                                                        
36 International Labour Organization Department of Statistics, “Metadata: Sources and 
Methods,” International Labour Office Database on Labour Statistics, online, 
LABORSTA Internet, 5 Sep. 2014. 
 16 
Besides, the development level of China’s domestic demand market was low. China’s 
land is 96 times and 25 times larger than that of the ROK and Japan, its population is 
27 times and 10 times larger than that of the ROK and Japan, the absolute quantity of 
China’s domestic market should be very large, and the domestic markets of the ROK 
and Japan constitute an obvious contrast. In addition, the economic ties between China 
and the international market was bound to be more and more close, which might not 
only directly affect the countries that have economic ties with China, but also spill 
over to a wider range. In the long run, the ROK and Japan do not have these 
characteristics. 
 
Secondly, the ROK’s economic structure is complementary with that of Japan. As a 
matter of fact, both the ROK and Japan are typical export-oriented economies, of 
which production scale is far beyond their domestic market demand, hence they are 
greatly affected by the world economy and the international markets. However, the 
ROK and Japan’s dependence on the international market is different from each other, 
mainly because the Japanese economy has been started earlier, the economy scale is 
larger, the domestic demand market is better developed, hence its resistance to the 
changes in the international market is stronger. While the yen is international reserve 
currency, currently Japan’s foreign currency reserve ranks the second largest in the 
world only behind China. Before 2006, Japan was the largest one. Compared to the 
ROK, Japan is more effective in resisting the impact of the international exchange rate 
fluctuations, and Japan’s performance in countering 1997 Asian financial crisis was 
more prominent. These factors determined that the ROK and Japan’s export-oriented 
economic structures are not identical, but complementary. 
 17 
 
Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade = ( Σ Export + Σ Import ) / GDP 
 
The complementarities of the economic structure of China, the ROK and Japan could 
be found from the analysis on the data of the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of 
China, the ROK and Japan. As shown above, the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign 
Trade reflects a country’s dependence on international market and foreign trade, which 
is one of the most important indicators in measuring a country’s opening to the outside 
world. The Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade equals the sum of a country’s export 
and import of divided by the country’s GDP. The larger the Ratio of Dependence on 
Foreign Trade is, the greater the openness of a country to the outside world is, and the 
deeper its interdependence with international market is. 37 
 
World’s Average Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade = (Σ World’s Export + Σ 
World’s Import ) / World’s GDP 
 
The average Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of the world equals the sum of the 
world’s export and import of divided by the world’s GDP. 
 
                                                        
37 Gene M. Grossman, ed., Imperfect Competition and International Trade (Cambridge: 
MIT Press, 1992). 
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Figure 1 - Changing Trend of the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of China, 
the ROK and Japan Compared to the World’s Average 38 
 
As shown in figure 1, compared with the world’s average ratio, that of the ROK is 
obviously higher than the world’s average, and that of Japan is obviously lower. Of all, 
China is the closest to the world’s average. The figure shows that China, the ROK and 
Japan’s dependence on international trade is different. Because their economic 
structures are different, the three countries are highly complementary in foreign trade. 
 
 
Figure 2 - Changing Trend of the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of China, 
the ROK and Japan Compared to the Main Regional Economic Cooperation 
Mechanisms 39 
 
                                                        
38 World Trade Organization, “Trade: Merchandise Trade,” International Trade and 
Market Access Data, online, WTO, 5 Sep. 2014; World Bank, “Gross Domestic 
Product (Current US$),” Open Data, online, The World Bank, 5 Sep. 2014. 
39 World Trade Organization, “Trade: Merchandise Trade,” International Trade and 
Market Access Data, online, WTO, 5 Sep. 2014; World Bank, “Gross Domestic 
Product (Current US$),” Open Data, online, The World Bank, 5 Sep. 2014. 
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Meanwhile, if China, the ROK and Japan’s economic integration is achieved, the 
equilibrium and stability of the three countries in international trade will be greatly 
enlarged. Then the advantages of economic structure of China, the ROK and Japan will 
be much more obvious than NAFTA, EU and ASEAN. 40 
 
d. Close Bilateral Foreign Trade Relations among the Three Countries 
The volumes of bilateral trade among China, the ROK and Japan are large, which is the 
root cause of the trilateral economic interdependence. 
 
Firstly, China, the ROK and Japan are all important trading partners for each other of 
them. In 1998, the trade between China and the ROK, China and Japan, the ROK and 
Japan reached 21.27 billion, 57.94 billion, and 29.08 billion US dollars respectively. 
The ROK and Japan were the third and the first largest trading partner of China 
respectively. China and Japan were the third and the second largest trading partner of 
the ROK respectively. China and the ROK were the second and the fourth largest 
trading partner of Japan respectively. In 2013, the trade volume among China and the 
ROK, China and Japan, the ROK and Japan reached 274.25 billion, 312.42 billion, and 
94.71 billion US dollars respectively. The ROK and Japan were the third and the 
second largest trading partners of China respectively. China and Japan were the first 
and the third largest trading partner of the ROK respectively. China and the ROK were 
the first and the third largest trading partner of Japan respectively. The expansion of 
the trade scale made the trilateral economic potential advantage into reality. 
                                                        
40 Jingyun Fu. “Exploring Economic Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia from 
the Perspective of Intra-regional Trade,” Northeast Asia Forum 4 (2011): 71-78. 
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Table 5 - Sum of Bilateral Foreign Trade Volume of China, the ROK and Japan 
among Them Compared to Their Total Foreign Trade Volume 41 
(Billions of US Dollars) 


























2013 586.67 4160.01 14.1 368.96 1075.22 34.3 407.13 1548.26 26.3 
2012 585.87 3867.12 15.2 359.62 1067.45 33.7 432.66 1684.41 25.7 
2011 588.46 3641.87 16.2 353.63 1079.63 32.8 450.83 1678.56 26.9 
2010 504.89 2974.00 17.0 299.59 891.60 33.6 390.25 1463.83 26.7 
2009 385.00 2207.54 17.4 227.41 686.62 33.1 299.98 1132.70 26.5 
2008 452.80 2563.26 17.7 275.28 857.28 32.1 355.94 1543.95 23.1 
2007 395.80 2176.57 18.2 242.47 728.34 33.3 318.57 1336.57 23.8 
2006 341.54 1760.44 19.4 212.71 634.85 33.5 285.76 1225.79 23.3 
2005 296.32 1421.91 20.8 184.36 545.66 33.8 256.82 1110.81 23.1 
2004 257.88 1154.56 22.3 157.89 478.31 33.0 235.68 1020.22 23.1 
2003 196.78 850.99 23.1 116.81 372.64 31.3 187.15 854.75 21.9 
2002 146.00 620.77 23.5 89.10 314.60 28.3 146.90 753.92 19.5 
2001 123.66 509.65 24.3 79.05 291.54 27.1 130.89 752.59 17.4 
2000 117.66 474.30 24.8 86.79 332.75 26.1 135.46 858.76 15.8 
1999 91.21 360.63 25.3 65.04 263.44 24.7 106.18 727.61 14.6 
1998 79.20 323.95 24.4 50.34 225.60 22.3 87.01 668.41 13.0 
 
Secondly, the sum of China, the ROK, and Japan’s respective bilateral foreign trade 
volume with the other two countries among them accounted for large ratio of their 
respective total foreign trade volume. As shown in table 5, in 1998, China’s foreign 
trade with the ROK and Japan was 79.2 billion US dollars, which accounted for 24.4% 
of China’s total foreign trade volume. the ROK’s foreign trade with China and Japan 
                                                        
41 National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Annual: Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation,” National Data, online, NBS, 5 Sep. 2014; Statistics Korea, “Trade, 
Foreign Exchange, Balance of Payments,” Statistical Database, online, Korean 
Statistical Information Service, 5 Sep. 2014; Ministry of Finance, “Trade and 
Investment Statistics,” Reports and Statistics, online, Japan External Trade 
Organization, 5 Sep. 2014. 
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was 50.34 billion US dollars, which accounted for 22.3% of the ROK’s total foreign 
trade volume. Japan’s foreign trade with China and the ROK was 87.01 billion US 
dollars, which accounted for 13% of Japan’s total foreign trade volume. 
 
Table 6 - Sum of Bilateral Foreign Trade Volume of China, the ROK and Japan 
among Them Compared to Their Foreign Trade Volume with the Main Economies 
and Regional Economic Cooperation Mechanisms 42 
(Billions of US Dollars) 








China 586.67 520.87 501.22 443.61 
ROK 368.96 103.57 84.64 135.32 
Japan 407.13 203.52 140.66 230.31 
2007 
China 395.80 302.07 327.34 202.51 
ROK 242.47 82.99 78.87 71.86 
Japan 318.57 214.22 159.10 173.89 
2003 
China 196.78 126.33 125.22 78.26 
ROK 116.81 59.03 44.27 38.71 
Japan 187.15 174.07 120.68 119.28 
1998 
China 79.20 54.83 48.90 23.64 
ROK 50.34 43.21 29.10 24.46 
Japan 87.01 190.98 113.30 88.83 
 
Thirdly, the volume of China, the ROK, and Japan’s respective bilateral foreign trade 
with the other two countries among them is much larger than their foreign trade with 
other main economies and regional cooperation mechanisms. As shown in table 6, in 
1998, the sum of China’s bilateral foreign trade with the ROK and Japan exceeded its 
respective foreign trade with the US, the EU(15) and ASEAN; the sum of the ROK’s 
bilateral foreign trade with China and Japan exceeded its respective foreign trade with 
                                                        
42 National Bureau of Statistics of China, “Annual: Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation,” National Data, online, NBS, 5 Sep. 2014; Statistics Korea, “Trade, 
Foreign Exchange, Balance of Payments,” Statistical Database, online, Korean 
Statistical Information Service, 5 Sep. 2014; Ministry of Finance, “Trade and 
Investment Statistics,” Reports and Statistics, online, Japan External Trade 
Organization, 5 Sep. 2014. 
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the US, the EU(15) and ASEAN. From 2003, the sum of Japan’s bilateral foreign trade 
with China and the ROK exceeded its respective foreign trade with the US, the EU(15) 
and ASEAN. And the gap was getting larger and larger, which means that the trilateral 
foreign trade among China, the ROK and Japan was getting more and more 
interdependent for all the three countries. 
 
C. INTERDEPENDENCE DRIVEN BY REGIONAL INTEGRATIONS 
After the end of the Cold War, with the international tension easing off and developing 
of globalization, high degree of interdependent relations were gradually formed among 
nations. In the background of economic globalization, regional economic cooperation 
started to develop dynamically all over the world. Different scales, different kinds and 
different levels of regional or sub-regional organizations and cooperation mechanisms 
were established. 
 
As shown in table 7, during the 1980s and 1990s, the EU, NAFTA, Southern Common 
Market (MERCOSUR) and Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade 
Agreement (CER) were all established as the major economic cooperation mechanisms 
in Europe, North America, South America and Oceania respectively. Asia was in 
similar situation. In the 1990s, Asian economy had greatly increased, especially in East 
Asia. Interdependence among nations was deepened, and capital was flowing more 
frequently. Asia became one of the most dynamic economies in the world. In 1992, 
ASEAN officially declared the establishment of ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) on 
the fourth ASEAN Summit. The main target of AFTA was to reach an agreement on the 
Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT), that meant implementing a zero tariff 
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among member countries, which required ASEAN members to lower tariffs or even 
cancel tariff barriers in the following fifteen years. In 1993, seven countries out of 
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) signed SAARC 
Preferential Trading Arrangement (SAPTA), leading to the three rounds’ trade 
negotiations, which resulted in tariff concession by 7.5% to 100% of 2100 items and 
tariff abolish 180 items. 43 
 
Table 7 - Main Regional and Sub-regional Economic Cooperation Mechanism 
(Until 1998) 44 
 Official Name Founded Year 
Members 
Amount 
CANFTA Andean Community Free Trade Area 1994 5 
EU European Union 1993 15 
SAPTA 
South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation Preferential Trading 
Arrangement 
1993 7 
CISEU Commonwealth of Independent States Economic Union 1993 12 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 1992 10 
NAFTA North American Free Trade Area 1992 3 
BSEC Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization 1992 11 
CEFTA Central European Free Trade Agreement 1992 4 
SADC Southern African Development Community 1992 14 
MERCOSUR Southern Common Market 1991 4 
CER Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement 1990 2 
GCC Gulf Cooperation Council 1981 6 
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States 1975 16 
EFTA European Free Trade Association 1960 7 
 
                                                        
43 The Yearbook of World Economy Editorial Committee, ed., The Yearbook of World 
Economy 2013 (Beijing: China Social Sciences Press, 2014). 
44 World Affairs Almanac Editorial Committee, ed., World Affairs Almanac 2013/2014 
(Beijing: World Affairs Press, 2014). 
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Table 8 - Regional and Sub-regional Free Trade Mechanism Participated by GDP 
Top 30 Economies (1998) 45 






1 United States 9,089,100 29.87% NAFTA 
2 Japan 3,914,575 12.86%  
3 Germany 2,178,171 7.16% EU 
4 United Kingdom 1,477,759 4.86%  
5 France 1,468,872 4.83% EU 
6 Italy 1,224,580 4.02% EU 
7 China 1,019,462 3.35%  
8 Brazil 843,827 2.77% MERCOSUR 
9 Canada 631,432 2.07% NAFTA 
10 Spain 600,652 1.97% EU 
11 Mexico 502,010 1.65% NAFTA 
12 India 428,741 1.41% SAPTA 
13 Netherlands 402,648 1.32% EU 
14 Australia 399,523 1.31% CER 
15 Korea, Rep. 376,482 1.24%  
16 Argentina 362,134 1.19% MERCOSUR 
17 Switzerland 278,904 0.92% EFTA 
18 Russian Federation 270,953 0.89% CISEU 
19 Turkey 269,287 0.88% BSEC 
20 Belgium 255,599 0.84% EU 
21 Sweden 254,723 0.84% EU 
22 Austria 213,330 0.70% EU 
23 Denmark 173,653 0.57% EU 
24 Poland 172,902 0.57% CEFTA 
25 Hong Kong, China 46 168,886 0.55%  
26 Norway 151,139 0.50% EFTA 
27 Saudi Arabia 145,773 0.48% GCC 
28 Greece 135,274 0.44% EU 
29 South Africa 134,296 0.44% SADC 
30 Finland 129,763 0.43% EU 
 Top 30 27,674,450 90.94%  
 World 30,431,067 100.00%  
 
                                                        
45 World Bank, “Gross Domestic Product Ranking Table (1998),” Data Catalog, online, 
The World Bank, 5 Sep. 2014; World Bank, “Economy and Growth,” World 
Development Indicators 2008, World Bank Publications, online, The World Bank, 
2008. 
46 As one of the special administrative regions of China, Hong Kong is included as an 
individual economy in this form. 
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As shown in table 8, the trilateral economic integration level among China, the ROK, 
and Japan was insufficient. According to the global trend, by 1998 most of the 
countries that ranked world top 30 had established or participated in different free 
trade mechanisms. In this regard, China, the ROK and Japan significantly fell behind. 
Because of historical and realistic difficulties, the trilateral economic integration was 
always given priority to bilateral interests between every two parties. Besides, the 
three countries were actively participating in the international general free trade 
arrangements such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO). 47 The effort and attempt of China, the ROK and 
Japan was in great shortage of establishing the trilateral economic cooperation 
mechanism. Therefore, China, the ROK, and Japan were the rest several countries that 
ranked world top 30 without joining a tight regional or sub-regional free trade 
mechanism in 1998. 
 
D. RISE AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING 
In the background of global interdependence, the strong trend of globalization and 
regional cooperation, especially after the 1997 Asia financial crisis, the leaders of 
China, the ROK and Japan all realized the importance of establishing a regional 
economic cooperation mechanism and the possible contribution it might usher. 
Besides, leaders did believe that the three countries should be united in overcoming the 
financial crisis, and it was necessary to establish a leader-level cooperation mechanism 
among the three countries to enhance the trilateral cooperation. 
                                                        
47 Jingyun Fu, “Exploring Economic Cooperation Mechanism in Northeast Asia from 
the Perspective of Intra-regional Trade,” Northeast Asia Forum 4 (2011): 71-78. 
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a. The Trilateral Summit Meeting within the Framework of 10+3 Summit 
The China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism was initiated in 1999. Chinese 
Premier Zhu Rongji, the ROK President Kim Dae-Jung and Japanese Prime Minister 
Keizo Obuchi had a breakfast meeting during 10+3 Summit in the Philippines in 
November, 1999, which ushered the trilateral summit meeting within the framework of 
10+3 Summit. From 1999 to 2007, China, the ROK and Japan held eight trilateral 
Summit Meetings within each 10+3 Summit, and each trilateral summit meeting 
resulted in significant achievements. 
 
Table 9 - China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting within the Framework of 10+3 
Summit (1999-2007) 48 
 Time/Place Core Achievements 
1st Nov. 1999 Philippines 
Launched the China-ROK-Japan cooperation and the trilateral 
summit meeting within the framework of 10+3 Summit. 
2nd Nov. 2000 Singapore 
Decided to have a regular trilateral summit meeting within the 
framework of 10+3 Summit. 
3rd Nov. 2001 Brunei 
Exchanged views on further promoting economic and trade 
cooperation among the three countries and reached broad 
consensus. 
4th Nov. 2002 Cambodia 
Identified economic and trade, information industry, 
environmental protection, human resource and culture as five 
major areas. 
5th Oct. 2003 Indonesia 
Signed “Joint Declaration on the Promotion of Tripartite 
Cooperation”. Decided to set up a Tripartite Commission. 
6th Nov. 2004 Laos 
Discussed on the development of trilateral cooperation and made 
plans to comprehensively promote cooperation in various fields. 
7th Jan. 2007 Philippines 
Issued a “Joint Press Statement” that showed the three countries 
had the willing to establish mutual trust and cooperation. 
8th Nov. 2007 Singapore 
Identified finance, technology, logistics, health, tourism, and 
youth exchange as six major areas and a series of trilateral 
programs. Agreed in principle to convene the trilateral summit 
meeting irregularly by turns. 
                                                        
48 Asian Department of Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, 
ed., A Collection of Documents of the Trilateral Cooperation among the People’s 
Republic of China, Japan and the Republic of Korea (1999-2009) (Beijing: World 
Affairs Press, 2009). 
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Firstly, the trilateral summit meetings brought in deep political dialogues and enhanced 
the level of the trilateral relations. Chinese Premier, the ROK President and Japanese 
Prime Minister attended all trilateral summit meetings. As shown in table 9, the three 
leaders exchanged views on strengthening and promoting the further trilateral 
cooperation. Many meaningful consensuses were reached. The three leaders 
announced, adopted and issued series of political documents. “Joint Declaration on the 
Promotion of Tripartite Cooperation among China, the ROK and Japan” was 
announced in 2003, which was the first joint document that initially defined the 
principles and cooperating areas; “The Action Strategy on Trilateral Cooperation 
among China, the ROK and Japan” was announced in 2004, which made a detailed 
plan for the all-round cooperation in various fields; “Joint Press Statement” was 
announced in 2007, which showed the three countries’ willingness to establish the 
trilateral trust, friendship and cooperation. 
 
Secondly, the trilateral summit meetings identified a series of key cooperating areas. In 
2002, the trilateral summit meeting defined economy and trade, information industry, 
environmental protection, human resource development and culture as the five major 
cooperating areas of the trilateral cooperation. In 2007, the trilateral summit meeting 
defined finance, technology, logistics, health, tourism, and youth exchange as the six 
major areas of the trilateral cooperation. The trilateral summit meetings made plans to 
comprehensively promote specific cooperation in various fields, such as the 
development of the trilateral cooperation action plan, setting up the network 
secretariat, strengthening of renewable energy and new energy technology cooperation, 
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joint research to maintain the framework of the Free Trade Area (FTA), marine search 
and rescue, anti-terrorism and other non-traditional security cooperation. 
 
Thirdly, the trilateral summit meetings established a series of the trilateral cooperative 
mechanisms. The trilateral summit meetings decided to set up a Tripartite Commission 
in 2003, which was headed by the foreign ministers of the three countries who would 
be responsible for research, planning, coordination and supervision of the trilateral 
cooperation and provided progress report annually to the trilateral summit meeting. 
Since 2004, Tripartite Commission meetings were held for five times: June 2004 
Qingdao China, November 2004 Vientiane Laos, May 2005 Kyoto Japan, January 2007 
Cebu the Philippines, November 2007 Singapore. These meetings officially approved 
three “Progress Report on the Trilateral Cooperation”. 49  As an achievement of 
institution construction, the three countries also agreed to convene the trilateral 
summit meeting irregularly in turn starting from 2007. 
 
b. The Trilateral Summit Meeting outside the Framework of 10+3 Summit 
In 2008, the first China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting was held in Fukuoka, Japan, 
outside the framework of 10+3 Summit, which opened a new era of the trilateral 
summit meeting. From 2008 to 2012, there were five meetings held by China, the ROK 
and Japan in turn annually. 
 
                                                        
49 The three “Progress Report on the Trilateral Cooperation” were approved on Nov. 
2004 on the 2nd Tripartite Commission in Vientiane Laos, Jan. 2007 on the 4th 
Tripartite Commission in Cebu Philippines and Nov. 2007 on the 5th Tripartite 
Commission in Singapore respectively. 
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Table 10 - China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting outside the Framework of 10+3 
Summit (2008-2012) 50 
 Time/Place Core Achievements 
1st Dec. 2008 Fukuoka 
Announced “Joint Statement for Tripartite Partnership”. 
Adopted the “Joint Statement on International Financial and 
Economic issues”, “Joint Statement on Disaster Management”, 
and “Action Plan on Promotion Trilateral Cooperation”. 
2nd Oct. 2009 Beijing 
Announced “Joint Statement on the Tenth Anniversary of 
Trilateral Cooperation”, and “Joint Statement on Sustainable 
Development”. Reached many cooperation initiatives. 
3rd May. 2010 Jeju 
Issued “Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020”, “Memorandum 
on the Establishment of the Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat”, 
“Joint Statement on Strengthening Science and Innovation 
Cooperation”, and “Joint Statement on Standards Cooperation”. 
4th May. 2011 Tokyo 
Issued “Joint Declaration” and three agreements of cooperation 
on disaster preparedness, nuclear safety, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency. Adopted thirteen cooperation areas such as 
trade, sustainable development, social and cultural exchanges. 
5th May. 2012 Beijing 
Signed “The Trilateral Investment Agreement”. Announced that 
the trilateral FTA agreement negotiation will be launched in 
2012. 
 
Firstly, the trilateral summit meetings achieved many significant political agreements. 
As shown in table 10, three leaders reviewed history, summed up the experience and 
enlightenment, and planned for the future of the trilateral cooperation. “Joint Statement 
for Tripartite Partnership” was announced in 2008; “Joint Statement on the Tenth 
Anniversary of Trilateral Cooperation” was announced in 2009, which clearly defined 
the partnership among three countries was to pursue comprehensive cooperation. The 
trilateral cooperation would be guided by the principles of openness, transparency, 
mutual trust, common interests and respect for diverse culture. The trilateral summit 
meeting issued “Trilateral Cooperation VISION 2020” in 2010 and “Joint Declaration” 
in 2011, which focused on specific goals and visions for cooperative partnership and 
                                                        
50 Trilateral Cooperation Studies Center, China-Japan-ROK Cooperation (1999-2013) 
(Beijing: China Foreign Affairs University Press, 2014). 
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determined a roadmap on how to strengthen the partnership among the three countries 
in the next decade, which pushed the trilateral cooperation onto another stage. 
 
Secondly, the trilateral summit meetings enhanced functional cooperation in specific 
areas, such as disaster prevention, nuclear safety, renewable energy and energy 
efficiency. The meetings also specified more than thirteen cooperation areas, including 
trade, sustainable development, social and cultural exchanges and so on. The meetings 
declared “Joint Statement on International Financial and Economic issues” in 2008, 
“Joint Statement on Disaster Management” in 2008, “Action Plan on Promotion 
Trilateral Cooperation” in 2008, “Joint Statement on Sustainable Development” in 
2009, “Joint Statement on Strengthening Science and Innovation Cooperation” in 2010, 
and “Joint Statement on Standards Cooperation” in 2010. All these documents strongly 
catalysed the improvement of trilateral cooperation and economic growth. 
 
“The Trilateral Investment Agreement” was signed in 2012, which marked the first 
legal economic document on the trilateral cooperation. “The Joint Trilateral FTA 
Study” was finished in 2011. There had been four rounds of the trilateral FTA 
negotiations, which were held in turn among the three countries. It was worth being 
emphasized that economic cooperation and trade investment among the three countries 
had made great achievements. 51 The trade volume among China, the ROK and Japan in 
2013 soared up to 3484 billion US dollars, which was five times of the number as in 
1998 which was 704 billion US dollars. Currently, China is the largest trading partner 
                                                        
51 Qi Zhang and Gang Lu, The Prospects of Expanding Intra-regional Investment 
among China, Japan and Korea (diss., Development Research Center of the State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China, 2010). 
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of the ROK and Japan. Meanwhile the ROK and Japan are China’s major trading 
partners and source of foreign investment. The social and cultural exchanges among 
China, the ROK and Japan are very active. There were 20 million personnel exchanges 
in 2013, of which were only 6.5 million in 1999. The three countries agreed to explore 
the ocean, share experience network security and other new areas of cooperation. 
 
Thirdly, the trilateral summit meetings promoted trilateral institutional construction. 
The three countries had formed an all-dimensional, multi-tiered and wide-ranging 
cooperation framework. The Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meeting mechanism, as a 
preparation for the annual trilateral summit meeting, was established in 2007 and held 
for six times. The three Foreign Ministers mainly exchanged views on the progress of 
the trilateral cooperation, future plans, as well as regional and international issues of 
common concern. As another channel of communication mechanism, the Senior 
Foreign Affairs Officials’ Consultation on foreign affairs was also established in 2007, 
and held eight consultations. With the motivation of the trilateral summit meeting, up 
to 2013, the three countries had established eighteen minister-level meeting 
mechanisms of diplomatic, technological, information and communication, finance, 
human resources, environmental protection, transportation and logistics, economic and 
trade, culture, health, central bank, customs, intellectual property, tourism, earthquake, 
disaster management, water resources and agricultural, and more than fifty 
working-level exchange and cooperation platforms. 
 
As another important and remarkable achievement of the institutional construction of 
the trilateral cooperation, the establishment of Trilateral Cooperation Secretariat (TCS) 
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was approved in 2010 and “Memorandum on the Establishment of the Trilateral 
Cooperation Secretariat” was announced. In 2011, TCS was officially established in 
Seoul, which aims to support the trilateral pragmatic cooperation and friendly 
exchanges. TCS mainly provides administrative and technical support for the operation 
and management of the trilateral consultative mechanisms, meanwhile communicates 
with other international organizations on behalf of the three countries in exploring 
feasible cooperation projects. 
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III. IMPACTS OF HISTORICAL, POLITICAL AND SECURITY ISSUES ON 
THE CHINA-ROK-JAPAN SUMMIT MEETINGS 
 
 
After the fifth China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting was held in May 2012, the trilateral 
summit meeting was suspended. As the host country of the sixth trilateral summit 
meeting, the ROK has made many efforts to resume the trilateral summit meeting. 
However, due to historical and realistic reasons, especially historical, political and 
security issues significantly affected the trilateral summit meeting. In short term, the 
prospect of the resumption of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting seems to be very 
bleak. 
 
A. SENSITIVITY AND VULNERABILITY OF INTERDEPENDENCE 
The concept of sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependence were firstly mentioned 
by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye in the book of “Power and 
Interdependence” 52. According to their points, the complex interdependence between 
countries can be divided into three types: First, evenly balanced mutual dependence; 
second, pure mutual dependence or absolute dependence; third, relative dependence or 
asymmetric dependence. Whether the interdependence is symmetrical or asymmetrical, 
and the degree of asymmetry is determined by a country’s sensitivity and vulnerability 
reflection to other countries’ action. 53 
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53  Yongming Fan, Western International Political Economics, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: 
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“Sensitivity involves degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework—how 
quickly do changes in one country bring costly changes in another, and how great are 
the costly effects?” “Sensitivity interdependence can be social or political as well as 
economic.” “Vulnerability can be defined as an actor’s liability to suffer costs imposed 
by external events even after policies have been altered.” “Vulnerability dependence 
can be measured only by the costliness of making effective adjustments to a changed 
environment over a period of time.” 54  On the basis of interdependence theory, 
sensitivity and vulnerability is mutual dependent. Sensitivity interdependence and 
vulnerability interdependence affects each other. The deeper interdependence is, the 
stronger sensitivity and vulnerability of interdependence is. 
 
According to Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye’s view, the relationship between 
sensitivity and vulnerability should be as such: External change leads to a country’s 
internal changes, which causes sensitivity. If this sensitivity results in damage or 
potential damage to the country’s own interests, the country will take measures which 
are costly thus leads to vulnerability. Because changing in the existing policy 
framework is often complicated and hard to realize in a short period of time, which 
makes sensitivity interdependence as the country’s first result of external changes. 
Therefore, sensitivity and vulnerability is timely consistent, vulnerability will never 
exist separately without sensitivity. There is logical causal relationship between 
sensitivity and vulnerability. Sensitivity is the direct cause of vulnerability. However, 
the causal relationship between sensitivity and vulnerability is not ineluctable. 
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Vulnerability is necessarily caused by sensitivity, but sensitivity is not necessarily 
followed by vulnerability. 55 
 
The development of the trilateral relationship among China, the ROK and Japan 
demonstrated the sensitivity interdependence and vulnerability interdependence. 
Coupled with the close economic interdependence among the three countries, the 
trilateral relationship is still sensitive and can easily be destroyed. No matter how deep 
the trilateral economic interdependence is, it is possible that the trilateral relationship 
could be damaged by some delicate factors at any time, which will fatally impact on 
the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. 
 
B. IMPACTS ON THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING 
The impact factors of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting that caused sensitivity 
interdependence and vulnerability interdependence among the three countries are very 
complex, and both the historical and realistic factors among China, the ROK and Japan 
may affect the trilateral summit meeting. 56 The influential factors generally can be 
divided into historical issues, political issues and security issues. 
 
a. Historical Issues 
I. Japan’s Attitude toward Historical Issues 
There are traditions and practices of aggression and expansion to neighboring 
countries in Japanese history. In recent history, Japan has launched the war against 
                                                        
55  Yongming Fan, Western International Political Economics, 2nd ed. (Shanghai: 
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China and the ROK for several times. For examples, the troops of Japan’s Hideyoshi 
captured Seoul and Pyongyang in 1592, which indicated the start of the war on the 
Korean Peninsula. The Ming Dynasty sent troops to fight against Japanese aggression 
together with the Joseon Dynasty. After six years of the Anti-Japanese War, the Ming 
Dynasty and the Joseon Dynasty united army gained the victory in 1598. This war is 
called Wanli Korean War by China, and Im-jin Waeran and Jeong-yu Jaeran (or Im-jin 
Joguk Jeonjaeng) by Korea. In 1894, Japan launched a war of aggression against The 
Qing Dynasty and the Joseon Dynasty, and the Japanese troops defeated the Qing army. 
The Qing government was forced by the military pressure of Japanese militarism to 
sign the unequal “Treaty of Shimonoseki” with Japan in 1895. In accordance with the 
Chinese Lunar Calendar, China called it the Jiawu Sino-Japanese War, and it is 
internationally and commonly known as the First Sino-Japanese War. In 1910, 
Japanese troops besieged the imperial palace in Seoul, and forced the Korean 
government to sign “Japan-Korea Annexation Treaty”. After that Japan completely 
annexed Korea and began thirty-six years of colonial rule in Korea. Japan invaded 
China in 1931, and gradually made part of China as its colony until Japan’s surrender 
in the end of the World War II in 1945. 57 
 
Japan’s attitude toward history related to the national feelings of other countreis. 
Historic entanglements among the three countries, including unpleasant history of war, 
which have ignited people’s deep national emotion and nationalism, even enmity 
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toward another country and the people. 58 During the fourteen years and thirty-six 
years of colonial rule in China and Korean Peninsula, Japanese committed war crimes 
and crimes against humanity, such as killings, rape, arson and robbery. Japanese troops 
killed tens of millions of Chinese civilians. The Nanjing Massacre was one of the 
cruelest war crimes that Japanese invaders have committed in China, and at least 
300,000 Chinese people were slaughtered by Japanese troops within six weeks. 59 
Japan implemented the slavery policy on the Korean Peninsula, and plundered a large 
amount of wealth, and forced recruitment of soldiers as the tool of its war of 
aggression in Asia, and forced recruitment of civilian females as comfort women, 
which caused the loss of life and the dignity of a large number of the people in Korean 
Peninsula. All of these were engraved on the heart of the Chinese and Korean people, 
and became the unforgettable pains of the two nations. Therefore Japan’s attitude to 
the period of the aggression history directly linked to the national emotion of the 
Chinese and Korean people to Japanese, and also the peaceful atmosphere for the 
trilateral relationships. 
 
There has been no real introspection of Japan on its history crime of aggression in the 
World War II. Compared with the attitude of Germany on history issues of the World 
War II, Japan’s attitude is very disappointing and caused strong antipathy from the 
Chinese and Korean people. China and Korea request the Japanese government to 
avoid hurting the feelings of the two nations who had suffered from the Japanese 
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aggressions, especially with the issues of text books to the young generation, comfort 
women issue, and senior government officials’ visits to the Yasukuni Shrine where the 
war criminals were worshiped. China and Korea request Japan to face the history 
squarely and honestly, and they would not like to see the history issues became 
obstacles for future relations. However, Japan refused to acknowledge and reflect on 
the history of aggression, and hurt the feelings of the Chinese and Korean people time 
to time again. 
 
Japan’s rightist politics are getting more and more serious. In recent years, Junichiro 
Koizumi’s government and Shinzo Abe’s government, including some politicians have 
no correct understanding of crimes of Japanese militarism during the World War II, 
continue to take actions on visits to the Yasukuni Shrine and distort the truth in history 
textbooks, and refuse to acknowledge the comfort women issue and other issues. 
Shinzo Abe has re-defined the concept of aggression, and taken negative attitude 
toward Japan’s aggression history to neighboring countries. Especially Shinzo Abe’s 
authority has lifted a ban on collective self-defense rights and sought the amendment 
of the peace constitution which aims to pave the way for the return of Japan to political 
and military power, which has shown the deep-going change of Japan’s domestic 
political situation. All of Japan’s above behavior aroused the nationalist emotion 
between China and Japan, as well as the ROK and Japan. In such emotional 
understanding of the historical issues among the three countries, the bilateral disputes 
have deviated from the value judgment of right and wrong, and become more and more 
pure contest that involves national interests and national feelings, turning into other 
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fronts of power competition between China and Japan. 60 Japan’s wrong attitude on 
historical issues significantly affected China and the ROK, both the governments and 
societies, and become the obstacles and difficulties of the China-ROK-Japan Summit 
Meeting. 
 
Π. Analysis based on Interdependence Theory 
According to the analysis based on the method of interdependence theory, because 
Japan’s attitude on historical issues is linked to China’s public opinion toward Japan, 
once Japan takes negative action on the historical issues, due to the high speed of 
information transmition by means of traditional media and new media, public 
opposition in China and the ROK against Japan will be provoked quickly and with 
great intensity, with which the cost of great sensitivity, leading to sensitivity 
interdependence. Meanwhile, because the governments of China and the ROK are 
strongly influenced by the public opinion, vulnerability interdependence of China and 
the ROK involved in the formulation of policies on Japan will increase. The 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism which is participated by Japan is 
bounded to be affected. 
 
The conclusion is that, Japan’s historical issues especially Japan’s attitude to its 
militarist aggression in China and Korea during the World War II has become the 
inflammable factor and the key political obstacle between Japan and China, the ROK, 
and directly impacts on the resumption of the trilateral summit meeting. The historical 
                                                        
60 Feng Zhu, “Power Shift, Identity Conflict and Strategic Choice: The Strategy for 
Future Sino-Japanese Relations,” World Economics and Politics 3 (2007): 16-25. 
 40 
revisionism of Junichiro Koizumi and Shinzo Abe caused the negative identity of the 
peoples of China and the ROK to Japan, which seriously impacted the public opinion 
of China and the ROK, and then impacted the bilateral relations between Japan and 
China, the ROK, thus hampering the trilateral summit meeting. In 2005, because then 
Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi insisted on visiting the Yasukuni Shrine, 
the seventh China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting in the framework of 10+3 Summit had 
to be postponed. Similar history repeated in 2013. In December 2013, Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe visited the Yasukuni Shrine, which caused strong opposition by 
China and the ROK. Because of the Yasukuni Shrine issue, the sixth China-ROK-Japan 
Summit Meeting was not held in 2013, which was the first time that the trilateral 
summit meeting has ceased since 2008. In the short term, the prospect of the restart of 
the next trilateral summit meeting is very bleak. 
 
b. Political Issues 
Ι. Territorial Issues 
As the most important political issues, the disputes on the territory among China, the 
ROK and Japan include the relevant islands’ sovereignty ownership and the 
controversy about the marine resource. The territorial issues among the three countries 
are mainly the Diaoyu Islands (Japanese called Senkaku Islands) issue between China 
and Japan, the Dokdo (Japanese called Takeshima) issue between the ROK and Japan, 
and the Suyan Islet (the ROK called Ieodo) issue between China and the ROK. 
Territory disputes involve the national interests, including economic interests and 
security interests. 61 
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Both Japan and China claim the territory of the Diaoyu Islands and some areas of the 
East China Sea. Firstly, the Diaoyu Islands contain a large amount of oil and gas 
resources, and the attribution of the Diaoyu Islands involves the East China Sea oil and 
gas development issues, as well as a large area of marine Exclusive Economic Zones 
(EEZ). Secondly, because the East China Sea in which the Diaoyu Islands is located in 
an important route of China’s imports from foreign energy sea lanes, the ownership of 
the Diaoyu Islands is closely linked to China’s economic development and steady 
energy supply chain. Thirdly, due to the lack of strategic depth, Japan considers the 
Diaoyu Islands as an excellent platform by which the scope of its military defense 
expands westward for more than 300 kilometers; China is surrounded by neighboring 
island chain, so the Diaoyu Islands provide an optimal channel through the clearance 
between the Taiwan Island and the Ryukyu Islands to the Pacific for China. China 
formally proposed the idea to Japan on jointly developing resources near the Diaoyu 
Islands through diplomatic channels in 1978, until the 1980s, China and Japan have 
been taking the approach of setting aside the disputes on the Diaoyu Islands issue. 62 
However, the contradictions surrounding the ownership of the Diaoyu Islands between 
China and Japan continued to be highlighted in recent years. Since the late 1990s, 
Japan has been strengthening the substantive jurisdiction of the Diaoyu Islands through 
the establishment of the lighthouse, individual lease and other methods. 
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Both the ROK and Japan claim the territory of the Dokdo and some sea areas between 
them. The Dokdo surrounding sea area is rich in fishery resources, and the ownership 
of a large number of mineral resources area can bring considerable economic benefits. 
The Dokdo, geographically located in the central of the Sea of Japan, equivalent to the 
core of the Northeast Asian region, is a strategic stronghold to control the Sea of Japan 
and radiate to the entire Northeast Asia. The Dokdo is currently subject to actual 
control of the ROK, and the ROK has set lighthouse and beacon on the island, and 
stationed guard personnel. Since the 1980s, a few residents of long-term residence 
began to live on the island. In recent years, both Japan and the ROK seek to further 
strengthen their respective positions on the Dokdo. Against this background, the 
Dokdo issue was heating up again. 63 
 
The Suyan Islet issue between China and the ROK was hyped in recent years by some 
folk people and media with nationalist sentiment. The Suyan Islet is an underwater 
reef, and it has no territorial status, so there is no territorial dispute between China and 
the ROK on the legal basis. The Chinese government has clearly stated China’s 
position on the issue of the Suyan Islet, “The Suyan Islet is an isolated and submerged 
reef rather than territory. China and the ROK have the consensus that the two sides 
have no territorial dispute over that. The Suyan Islet is in the overlapping waters of the 
EEZ of China and the ROK. This issue can only be resolved through negotiation on 
maritime demarcation.” 64 
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However, it is located in the overlapping area of EEZ that China and the ROK claim. In 
the delimitation of the sea, the governments of China and the ROK have different 
claims. Because the ownership of the Suyan Islet involves the sentiment of the Chinese 
and Korean people, it got to be a complex issue between China and the ROK. 
 
Disputes to the islets and the nearby sea areas are based on the interests of each 
country. Since these sovereignty disputes on territory are largely a “zero-sum” game, 
there is very little room to compromise for each party, and it is not realistic to expect 
any of the parties to give up their positions easily. These disputes have restricted the 
deep-seated mutual trust among the three countries, and influenced the political 
environment for the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
Π. Analysis based on Interdependence Theory 
According to the analysis method of interdependence theory, from the perspective of 
sensitivity, after other country changed, if one country’s corresponding change is fast 
enough, and the change is large enough, it can be said that the sensitivity of the 
country is high. Territorial issues related to national direct benefits, including politics, 
in particular public opinion, economic and military security interests, any change is 
likely to be transferred through multiple channels and cause negative influence to other 
countries, thus resulting in sensitivity, which is the direct cost, therefore the sensitivity 
of interdependence is quite high. Moreover, due to difficulties to deal with similar 
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problems, after paying the price of sensitivity, to change or attempt to change the 
existing policy framework is also costly thus resulting in vulnerability. At the same 
time, due to similar situations in China, the ROK and Japan, any change in policy 
between the two countries, will expand the spillover to the other two bilateral 
relations, and thus the sensitivity and vulnerability cost will be further enlarged. 
 
The conclusion is that, territory disputes impact the resumption of the 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. When either party changes or tries to change its 
position on territorial issues, territorial disputes between China, the ROK and Japan 
will immediately show a series of consequences, one of the most direct is in the rise of 
the nationalism of three countries. Nationalism sentiments could be further amplified 
by territorial issues, and due to the lack of rational management abilities, the strength 
of the impediment is much larger, which makes it difficult to make concessions for 
each state. Once nationalism expands to politics, the claim on the territorial integrity 
will above all else, at this moment, any compromise on this issue, adding with 
patriotism, it will be difficult to handle for the government. 65 As a result, the parties 
will take tougher measures in escalation, gradually expanding from pure territorial 
measures to other areas, which would inevitably undermine the trilateral summit 
meeting mechanism. 
 
In terms of the Diaoyu Islands territorial disputes between China and Japan, after 
Shinzo Abe’s government came to power, the situations of the Diaoyu Islands disputes 
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were upgrading. The Diaoyu Islands issue was heating up in 2013 by Shinzo Abe’s 
improper remarks. Shinzo Abe said that the Diaoyu Islands are Japanese territory, no 
matter in history or in international law in April 2013, which angered Chinese people. 
In November 2013, the Ministry of Defense of China announced the designation of the 
East China Sea Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), including the airspace near 
the Diaoyu Islands. The China-Japan bilateral relations got serious impacted by the 
disputes on the Diaoyu Islands. And the disputes on the East China Sea oil and gas 
resources development between China and Japan involve maritime delimitation, 
marine resource allocation and other complex issues, which remain unresolved. 
 
In terms of the Dokdo territorial disputes between the ROK and Japan, in July 2008, 
the Ministry of Education and Science of Japan announced that, the middle school 
textbooks that are going to be in use in the year of 2012, will include contents saying 
that the Takeshima is Japanese territory for the first time. The ROK lodged a strong 
protest against Japan’s behavior. The ROK President Lee Myung-Bak expressed “deep 
disappointment and regret” on the matter. 66  And the ROK Prime Minister Han 
Seung-Soo boarded a helicopter and visited the Dokdo and expressed the commitment 
to defend the ROK’s sovereignty of the Dokdo. In August 2012, President Lee 
Myung-Bak visited the Dokdo and declared that the ROK has the sovereignty 
ownership over the islands, and the ROK established the Dokdo guardian signs on a 
stone to show ROK’s sovereignty. Due to the Dokdo issue, the ROK-Japan relationship 
deteriorated rapidly. 
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c. Security Issues 
As a hot security issue of Northeast Asia, and even the world, Korean Peninsula issue 
indirectly impacts on the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. Although the Cold War 
has ended for years, its consequences are far-reaching, and it is difficult to eliminate 
the long-term impact of the Cold War in Northeast Asia. Currently Northeast Asia is 
still in the period of order reconstruction after the Cold War. Mechanism of peace and 
security in Northeast Asia is not established, and many uncertain factors affected the 
security and stability of the region. 
 
After the World War II, the war broke out on the Korean Peninsula. Today, Northeast 
Asia is the only remnant of the Cold War area in the world. The Korean Peninsula issue 
is one of the hot issues in Northeast Asia, and it is also one of the biggest problems of 
variables in today’s world. The Korean Peninsula issue involves many factors, of 
which the core are security issues, including the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) and the ROK relations, and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue. As all 
of China, the ROK and Japan are in the Northeast Asian region, and the ROK is the 
direct party concerned on the Korean Peninsula issue, both China and Japan have 
serious concerns over the Korean Peninsula issue. Therefore, the Korean Peninsula 
issue inevitably becomes an important topic discussed in the trilateral summit meeting. 
And because the problem solving process of the Korean Peninsula issue often 
encountered obstacles, and China, the ROK and Japan have conflicting interests, the 
healthy development and the atmosphere of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting 
will suffer a lot. 
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Ι. Inter-Korean Issue 
The inter-Korean military confrontation and tensions impact the process of regional 
mitigation and cooperation. 67 Today, the Korean Peninsula is still split, and it has been 
continuously in a state of armistice since 1953. The DPRK and the ROK military 
confrontation has lasted for more than half a century. There are a large number of 
troops near the 38th Parallel, and the clouds of military tensions still wander over the 
Korean Peninsula. Although the inter-Korean relations have been improved much 
during President Kim Dae-Jung’s government (1998-2003) and President Roh 
Moo-Hyun’s government (2003-2008) by the implementation of Sunshine Policy on the 
DPRK, and the summit meeting between President Kim Dae-Jung and Secretary 
Genenal Kim Jong-Il (June 2000) and President Roh Moo-Hyun’s visit to Pyongyang 
(October 2007) were achieved as historical and remarkable events between the DPRK 
and the ROK. The inter-Korean relations comprehensively retrogressed during 
President Lee Myung-Bak’s government (2008-2013) by giving up reconciliation 
policy and pushing for tougher policy on the DPRK. 68 
 
In this context, a series of events broke out between the DPRK and the ROK, including 
the November 2009 maritime conflict, the March 2010 Cheonan Ship incident and the 
November 2010 Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident. 69  Then the military 
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confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK was very intense that even once pushed 
the situation on the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war. All of these events seriously 
damaged the inter-Korean relations, and aggravated the anti-DPRK emotion of the 
people of the ROK. 70 These events also spread to the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism, and made the inter-Korean relations issue, including the Cheonan Ship 
incident, and the situation of the Korean Peninsula issues become important issues of 
the trilateral summit meeting. Which also affected the atmosphere of discussion, thus 
inevitably reduced the attention by all parties, and caused a shift of focus of the 
trilateral summit meeting. And there is no participation of the DPRK, who is one of the 
main parties on the Korean Peninsula issues, therefore the discussions are difficult to 
have direct positive effect on the situation of the Korean Peninsula. 
 
After coming to power in 2013, ROK President Park Geun-Hye has actively promoted 
the process of the trust on the Korean Peninsula, and delivered the Dresden 
Declaration on the unification of the Korean Peninsula. At the same time, ROK 
government requires the DPRK to take substantive and initiative actions on 
denuclearization. However, the DPRK made negative reaction on the relevant 
proposals to the ROK. Therefore inter-Korean relations are not effectively improved, 
and still there is possibility of military conflict between the DPRK and the ROK. This 
condition of inter-Korean relations negatively impacted to the mitigation of the 
regional situation, and will also affect the atmosphere of the trilateral summit meeting 
in the future. 
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Π. Korean Peninsula Nuclear Issue 
The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue is a global hot security issue, which makes 
Northeast Asian political circumstance more complicated. The Korean Peninsula 
nuclear crisis has the history of more than 20 years, which aggravated the tensions of 
Northeast Asian situation and the contradictions between the DPRK and the US, the 
ROK, and Japan, and strengthened US-ROK and US-Japan alliance. To achieve the 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the common concerns of China, the ROK 
and Japan on the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, but on the approach, China, the ROK 
and Japan do not share the same view. Thus, whenever the Korean Peninsula nuclear 
issue becomes a hot issue, the divergences among China, the ROK and Japan will be 
conspicuously highlighted, and even the atmosphere of the trilateral cooperation 
process and the trilateral summit meeting will be affected. 
 
Especially, the DPRK has carried out three times of nuclear tests, and the United 
Nations Security Council (UNSC) has passed resolutions of sanctions after each 
nuclear test of the DPRK. The DPRK did not accept but condemned UNSC resolutions, 
and asserted that the DPRK has reasonable right to develop nuclear power to defense 
itself under US military and nuclear threat. Due to the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, 
the international and unilateral sanctions on the DPRK have been implemented. 
Especially, the US is strengthening its military deployment in the region and 
conducting large-scale military exercises with the ROK and Japan by the reason of the 
Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, which exacerbated the tensions and the uncertainty of 
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the security situation in Northeast Asia. 71 Most importantly, these actions of the US 
directly affected China’s realistic security interests, so the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism is also inevitably affected. 
 
Ш. Analysis based on Interdependence Theory 
Inter-Korean relations and the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue originally had no direct 
relationship with the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism, but whenever 
events involving the Korean Peninsula, such as the Cheonan Ship incident, the 
Yeonpyeong Island shelling incident, the DPRK nuclear test and other issues, because 
the ROK is the party directly involved, and security interests of China and Japan are 
directly linked, all of these events will inevitably lead to their respective adjustment of 
policies on the Korean Peninsula. The policy changes in any country will cause the 
other two countries’ relevant changes on their policies. In order to alleviate the damage 
on national interests caused by the adverse change, the country had to take measures, 
such as necessary changing or adjusting against the existing policy framework, which 
is the country’s cost to cope with the situation, including direct expenditures and the 
resulting indirect losses. Thus, there is vulnerability interdependence in the mechanism 
of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. 
 
There is long confrontation between the DPRK and the ROK, and each with military 
sensitivity and vulnerability. Assuming the DPRK to strengthen its military power, or 
the occurrence of major military security incidents, then will inevitably lead to the 
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increase of the ROK’s military sensitivity. In order to maintain the balance of power 
between the DPRK and the ROK, to cope with the crisis caused by a variety of reasons, 
the ROK will inevitably adjust its policies, including strengthening its national defense 
strength, a close military alliance with the US, whose goal is against the DPRK. 
 
Because of traditional friendly and cooperation relations between China and the 
DPRK, 72 the treaty between the two countries stipulates that, the Contracting Parties 
undertake jointly to take all measures to prevent any aggression against any one 
country of the Contracting Parties. Once when any Contracting Party was attacked by 
one country or several countries’ combined armed forces, thus in a state of war, the 
other Contracting Party shall immediately do its utmost to give military and other 
assistance. 73 Assuming the ROK to adjust its defense policy to improve military 
strength and enhance ROK-US alliance, then will lead to the rise of China’s military 
sensitivity, thereby resulting in interests’ conflict between China and the ROK. And 
this will inevitably affect the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism. 
 
By the same token, the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue has the similar effect. From a 
logical point of view, if the DPRK developed nuclear weapons and long-range ballistic 
missiles, or launched a nuclear test, this inevitably leads to military sensitivity rise of 
the ROK. China and Japan’s military sensitivity will rise too, for they are close 
neighbors of Korean Peninsula. And such events will lead to the policy adjustment, 
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which is costly thus resulting in vulnerability. And because of the potential 
confrontation factors in the complex relationship among China, the ROK and Japan, 
when one country in the three to adjust defense policy due to the Korean Peninsula 
nuclear issue, also will further increase military sensitivity of the other two parties, 
and then creates the spillover effect. Of course, in reality, the purpose of Japan’s 
military action against the DPRK nuclear and missile issues is no more than excuses to 
revive its military capability. 
 
C. WHY THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING WAS SUSPENDED 
In regional cooperation, economy, mutual identification and cooperative mechanism 
are indispensable elements. If any one of them encounters problem, the cooperation 
will be difficult. 74 If economy is quite good, but mutual identification has problems, 
nationalism caused by historical and territorial issues will impact the trilateral summit 
meeting. Of course, such issues include indirect factors such as the Korean Peninsula 
issue. But these problems also existed in the past, why the trilateral summit was able to 
successfully start, and separate from the 10+3 summit later on? Why now the historical 
issues are so prominent that the trilateral summit meeting can not be reopened for two 
years? The reasons can be explained by the interdependence theory, the growing 
structural contradiction between China and Japan, and the asymmetry of 
interdependence between China and the ROK, Japan plays as core internal reason, and 
the influence brought by US regional strategy toward the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism is main external reason. 
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a. Internal Reasons 
Ι. Structural Contradiction between China and Japan 
Interdependence does not exclude the possibility of competition and conflict in the 
distribution of benefits. According to the neo-realism school in international relations 
theory, the shift of power structure in international system is an important factor in 
determining international behavior. Because of the change of power balance between 
countries caused by capacity allocation changes, the country affected had to take on 
the balancing, bandwagoning, buck-passing or chain-gang and other strategic response 
based on the security needs by “relative income” standards. The most important 
variable on determining a country’s strategic choice on power changes is the need of 
domestic politics. 
 
There is structural contradiction between China and Japan, which is increasing by 
China’s rise. Coupled with China’s great economic development, the comprehensive 
national strength is rising rapidly, including the hard power, soft power, and 
international influence. China’s rise made Japan psychologically not comfortable and 
hard to adapt easily, and Japan is full of doubt and anxiety toward China’s rise. 75 
Before 2010, Japan was the second largest economy in the world, just behind the the 
US. However, China caught up with and surpassed Japan to become the second largest 
economy in 2010. From then on, the era of gap was ended between Japan and China, 
and the two countries began to be neck and neck with each other, not only in Northeast 
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Asian economy but also in the world economy. Coupled with long-term economic 
downturn in Japan’s economy and the rapid rise of China, the national sentiment of 
frustration occurred in Japan with the change of China and Japan’s international status. 
Japan began to worry that its initiative in Asia will receive the challenges from China, 
and the China Threat Theory was getting more and more welcome in Japan, especially 
in recent years. 76 
 
The tensions and conflicts between China and Japan can be explained by the security 
dilemma in realism theory of international politics. One power rising, its neighboring 
countries will ferment their doubt and apprehension toward this country, and there 
would be a structural security dilemma between the rising power and its neighbors. 
China’s rise is a historical necessity, which has been and will continue to have 
enormous political and strategic effects in Northeast Asia and throughout the world, 
and the impacts of China’s rise to the existing international system is inevitable. 
However the source of the problem is not that China’s rise caused new conflicts within 
the region, but rather the speculation of the intention of China’s rise from other 
countries including Japan and their uneasiness to China’s rise. 77 
 
The structural contradiction between China and Japan has led to the competition for 
leadership between China and Japan in the trilateral summit meeting mechanism. The 
contrast between political relations and economic relations is continuously increasing 
between China and Japan. Both China and Japan are one of the most important 
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economic partners to each other. The complementarities of economic structure and the 
interdependence on economic and trade relations between the two countries continue to 
be strengthened. However, the bilateral political relations between China and Japan is 
very cold, especially the leaders of the two countries have not paid visits to each other 
for quite a long time in recent years. 
 
Because of the shift of power between China and Japan, and Japan’s rising doubts and 
fears to future changes in power structure, Japan increasingly feels that the 
geographical proximity inevitably produces geopolitical competition with China, and 
differences in ideology and political system between China and Japan are bound to 
arouse Japan’s doubts toward China’s future policy and intention. In response to these 
changes, the rise of Japan’s political goal is not only to revise Japan’s peace 
constitution to become a normal country with collective self-defense rights, but also to 
enable Japan to cope with a strong China in the future, whether in terms of psychology, 
national will, national legal system or the comprehensive nation capacity building, 
including defense forces. 
 
Π. Asymmetry of Trilateral Interdependence between China and the ROK, Japan 
All of China, the ROK and Japan have benefited from the trilateral cooperation. China 
has made remarkable economic growth in the past fifteenth years since the 
establishment of the trilateral summit meeting, and its GDP growth and trade growth is 
far higher than the ROK and Japan. From following data analysis, the conclusion is 
that, ballance will continue to shift in the interdependence among the three countries, 
the interdependence between China and the ROK, Japan is asymmetric. 
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Table 11 - GDP of China, the ROK and Japan and the Ratio of the World’s 
(1998-2013) 78 
(Billions of US Dollars, %) 
 World China ROK Japan China, ROK and Japan 
 GDP GDP % GDP % GDP % GDP % 
2013 73,082 9,240 12.6 1,305 1.8 4,902 6.7 15,446 21.1 
2012 72,197 8,229 11.4 1,223 1.7 5,938 8.2 15,390 21.3 
2011 70,832 7,322 10.3 1,202 1.7 5,906 8.3 14,430 20.4 
2010 63,983 5,931 9.3 1,094 1.7 5,495 8.6 12,520 19.6 
2009 58,391 4,990 8.5 902 1.5 5,035 8.6 10,927 18.7 
2008 61,652 4,522 7.3 1,002 1.6 4,849 7.9 10,373 16.8 
2007 56,224 3,494 6.2 1,123 2.0 4,356 7.7 8,973 16.0 
2006 49,889 2,713 5.4 1,012 2.0 4,357 8.7 8,081 16.2 
2005 46,040 2,257 4.9 898 2.0 4,572 9.9 7,727 16.8 
2004 42,540 1,932 4.5 765 1.8 4,656 10.9 7,352 17.3 
2003 37,756 1,641 4.3 681 1.8 4,303 11.4 6,624 17.5 
2002 33,624 1,454 4.3 609 1.8 3,981 11.8 6,044 18.0 
2001 32,414 1,325 4.1 533 1.6 4,160 12.8 6,018 18.6 
2000 32,586 1,198 3.7 562 1.7 4,731 14.5 6,491 19.9 
1999 31,569 1,083 3.4 486 1.5 4,433 14.0 6,002 19.0 
1998 30,431 1,019 3.4 376 1.2 3,915 12.9 5,311 17.5 
 
Compared with the ROK and Japan, China’s GDP growth is the most obvious. As 
shown in the table 11, from 1998 to 2013, the total GDP of China, the ROK and Japan 
increased by three times, from 5,311 billion US dollars to15,446 billion US dollars, 
and the ratio of China, the ROK and Japan’s total GDP of the world increased from 
17.5% to 21.1%. China’s GDP increased by nine times, from 1,019 billion US dollars 
to 9,240 billion US dollars, and the ratio of China’s GDP of the world increased from 
3.4% to 12.6%. The ROK’s GDP increased by four times, from 376 billion US dollars 
to 1,305 billion US dollars, and the ratio of th ROK’s GDP of the world increased from 
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1.2% to 1.8%. Japan’s GDP increased by 25%, from 3,915 billion US dollars to 4,902 
billion US dollars, but the ratio of Japan’s GDP of the world decreased from 12.9% to 
6.7%. The conclusion is that, since the establishment of the trilateral summit meeting, 
the total status of China, the ROK and Japan in international economy has improved, 
and in terms of economic growth China benefited the most, followed by the ROK, and 
Japan has gained relatively minimal benefits. 
 
Table 12 - Foreign Trade of China, the ROK and Japan and the Ratio of the 
World’s (1998-2013) 79 
(Billions of US Dollars, %) 
 World China ROK Japan China, ROK, and Japan 
 Trade Trade % Trade % Trade % Trade % 
2013 37,658 4,160 11.05 1,075 2.86 1,548 4.11 6,783 18.01 
2012 37,012 3,867 10.45 1,067 2.88 1,684 4.55 6,619 17.88 
2011 36,830 3,642 9.89 1,080 2.93 1,679 4.56 6,400 17.38 
2010 30,809 2,974 9.65 892 2.89 1,464 4.75 5,329 17.30 
2009 25,335 2,208 8.71 687 2.71 1,133 4.47 4,027 15.89 
2008 32,731 2,563 7.83 857 2.62 1,544 4.72 4,964 15.17 
2007 28,352 2,177 7.68 728 2.57 1,337 4.71 4,241 14.96 
2006 24,591 1,760 7.16 635 2.58 1,226 4.98 3,621 14.73 
2005 21,378 1,422 6.65 546 2.55 1,111 5.20 3,078 14.40 
2004 18,797 1,155 6.14 478 2.54 1,020 5.43 2,653 14.11 
2003 15,458 851 5.51 373 2.41 855 5.53 2,078 13.45 
2002 13,238 621 4.69 315 2.38 754 5.70 1,689 12.76 
2001 12,679 510 4.02 292 2.30 753 5.94 1,554 12.25 
2000 13,182 474 3.60 333 2.52 859 6.51 1,666 12.64 
1999 11,642 361 3.10 263 2.26 728 6.25 1,352 11.61 
1998 11,186 324 2.90 226 2.02 668 5.98 1,218 10.89 
 
Compared with the ROK and Japan, China’s foreign trade growth is the fastest. As 
shown in the table 12, from 1998 to 2013, the total foreign trade of China, the ROK 
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and Japan increased by five point five times, from 1,218 billion US dollars to 6,783 
billion US dollars, and the ratio of China, the ROK and Japan’s total foreign trade of 
the world increased from 10.89% to 18.01%. China’s foreign trade increased by 
thirteen times, from 324 billion US dollars to 4,160 billion US dollars, and the ratio of 
China’s foreign trade of the world increased from 2.9% to 11.05%. The ROK’s foreign 
trade increased by five times, from 226 billion US dollars to 1,075 billion US dollars, 
and the ratio of the ROK’s foreign trade of the world increased from 2.02% to 2.86%. 
Japan’s foreign trade increased by two times, from 668 billion US dollars to 1,548 
billion US dollars, but the ratio of Japan’s foreign trade of the world decreased from 
5.98% to 4.11%. The conclusion is that, since the establishment of the trilateral summit 
meeting, the status of China, the ROK and Japan in international trade was improved, 
and China gained the most benefits, followed by the ROK, and Japan only had 
relatively minimal gains. 
 
 
Figure 3 - Changing Trend of the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of China, 
the ROK and Japan among them (1998-2013) 80 
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Table 13 - Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of China, the ROK and Japan 
among Them (1998-2013) 81 
(Billions of US Dollars, %) 

















2013 586.7 4,160.0 14.1 369.0 1,075.2 34.3 407.1 1,548.3 26.3 
2012 585.9 3,867.1 15.2 359.6 1,067.5 33.7 432.7 1,684.4 25.7 
2011 588.5 3,641.9 16.2 353.6 1,079.6 32.8 450.8 1,678.6 26.9 
2010 504.9 2,974.0 17.0 299.6 891.6 33.6 390.3 1,463.8 26.7 
2009 385.0 2,207.5 17.4 227.4 686.6 33.1 300.0 1,132.7 26.5 
2008 452.8 2,563.3 17.7 275.3 857.3 32.1 355.9 1,544.0 23.1 
2007 395.8 2,176.6 18.2 242.5 728.3 33.3 318.6 1,336.6 23.8 
2006 341.5 1,760.4 19.4 212.7 634.9 33.5 285.8 1,225.8 23.3 
2005 296.3 1,421.9 20.8 184.4 545.7 33.8 256.8 1,110.8 23.1 
2004 257.9 1,154.6 22.3 157.9 478.3 33.0 235.7 1,020.2 23.1 
2003 196.8 851.0 23.1 116.8 372.6 31.3 187.2 854.8 21.9 
2002 146.0 620.8 23.5 89.1 314.6 28.3 146.9 753.9 19.5 
2001 123.7 509.7 24.3 79.1 291.5 27.1 130.9 752.6 17.4 
2000 117.7 474.3 24.8 86.8 332.8 26.1 135.5 858.8 15.8 
1999 91.2 360.6 25.3 65.0 263.4 24.7 106.2 727.6 14.6 
1998 79.2 324.0 24.4 50.3 225.6 22.3 87.0 668.4 13.0 
 
According to the analysis of the Ratio of Dependence on Foreign Trade of China, the 
ROK and Japan, China has gained more prominence in the trilateral cooperation. As 
shown in the table 13 and figure 3, from 1998 to 2013, the ROK’s Foreign Trade 
Dependence on China and Japan increased from 22.3% to 34.3%, Japan’s Foreign 
Trade Dependence on China and the ROK increased from 13% to 26.3%, however 
China’s Foreign Trade Dependence on the ROK and Japan decreased from 24.4% to 
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14.1%. In 1998, China’s Foreign Trade Dependence on the other two countries among 
China, the ROK and Japan was the biggest, but in 2013 China’s Foreign Trade 
Dependence among the three countries was the smallest. The conclusion is that, since 
the establishment of the trilateral summit meeting, China’s flexibility in the trade 
among China, the ROK and Japan has improved remarkably, and China’s position in 
the trilateral cooperation become more initiative; the ROK and Japan become more 
dependent on the trilateral trade, and they are more restrained and bound in the 
trilateral cooperation. 
 
b. External Reasons 
External factors from the US restrict the trilateral summit meeting. The US is the only 
superpower in the world, and it not only has global influence, but also the global 
interests. The US is not an endowed dominant power in Northeast Asia, but due to 
historical and practical factors, the US has showed the greatest interests and involved 
the most deeply and actively in promoting East Asian regional cooperation. In 
particular, as an objective existence, no matter the regional countries realize it or not, 
the US has enormous strategic, political, economic and security interests in Northeast 
Asia, and the influence of the US in Northeast Asia is far-reaching and real due to 
historical and realistic reasons. 82 Among many issues, security issue has always been 
the core concern of the US, and it is also the core means for the US to keep its political 
influence in Northeast Asia. 
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The US has a diplomatic tradition of early intervention in Northeast Asia, which 
mainly means two approaches. Firstly, for the US, an increasingly integrated Northeast 
Asia is not in line with the interests of the US in East Asia, and the US does not 
comply with the existing institutional arrangements in East Asia. The US has clearly 
stated that it will participate in East Asian institution construction. Secondly, in the 
process of China’s rapid rise, the US comes to realize that this will be disruptive 
effects for the strategic situation in Northeast Asia. There is a structural contradiction 
between the rise of China and the US, and the US worries that China will challenge 
Asia-Pacific security order led by the US. Therefore, the US has tried everything 
possible to contain China’s development, and prevent China from strengthening its 
regional and international influence. In this background, the US launched a strategy of 
Asia-Pacific Rebalancing and seeks to return to Asia-Pacific, paying more attention to 
focus on Asia, especially East Asia and Northeast Asia. 
 
The US maintains its dominance and political influence in Northeast Asia mainly by 
two means. Firstly, the US implements the policy in favor of ideological line in 
security cooperation. In Northeast Asia, relying on its current dominant position in 
international structure and alliance relations with the ROK and Japan, the US uses the 
differences in the political system and ideology and values between China and the 
ROK, China and Japan, to prompting the ROK and Japan to be always conservative 
and cautious in cooperation with China. Secondly, the US strengthens its military 
alliance with Japan and the ROK. US impact is more significant to the ROK and Japan 
because they are military allies. The US gives the priority to the bilateral alliances in 
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Northeast Asia and strengthens its military deployments in Northeast Asia. 83 US 
influence also acts on East Asian territory disputes, such as the Diaoyu Islands dispute 
between China and Japan, which made the bilateral issue more multilateral, regional 
and international. Japan follows the US in order to maintain its military advantages and 
keep distance with China. 84  As US ally, the ROK and Japan rely on economic 
cooperation with China, but value the security and political relations with the US, 
which has increased the competition between the China-ROK-Japan cooperation and 
the US-Japan-ROK cooperation. All of these factors negatively impact the 
China-ROK-Japan cooperation, and restrict the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
Due to historical and other factors, the ROK and Japan have demand for the US on 
defense issues, which by domestic law and international mechanisms has become their 
own structural needs. Since the ROK and Japan are strongly dependent on the US on 
defense issues, their sensitivity and vulnerability are both very high. This dependence 
is also conductive to China, so as to cause an effect to the China-ROK-Japan Summit 
Meeting mechanism. Therefore, from another perspective, there is sensitivity and 
vulnerability dependence between the alliance of the US and the ROK, Japan, and the 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism. 
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IV. CHINA’S POSITION ON THE CHINA-ROK-JAPAN SUMMIT MEETING 
 
 
Since the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism was established in 1999, 
China has attached great importance to the trilateral summit meeting, and has been 
committed to the development of the trilateral summit meeting. China is playing a 
more and more important role in the trilateral summit meeting mechanism. Facing the 
currently obstacles and difficulties in reopening the trilateral summit meeting, China 
has made great efforts to create good environment and conditions for the resumption of 
the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
A. EMPHASIS ON THE TRILATERAL SUMMIT MEETING 
China reiterated the great importance it has attached to the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism. 85  Successive Chinese leaders have stressed this position of Chinese 
government. When Chinese President Hu Jintao met with the ROK President Lee 
Myung-Bak and Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda in Beijing on May 14 2012, 
during the fifth China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting, he said that the close exchanges 
among the three leaders reflect the great importance the three nations attach to their 
relationships and cooperation among them, it is “very necessary and urgent” for China, 
the ROK and Japan to unite more closely for self development, and seek common 
development. He said, China highly values its ties with the ROK and Japan, and stands 
ready to work with them to properly handle existing problems and differences, respect 
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and accommodate each other’s major concerns, and promote development of its ties 
with the two counties. 86 
 
China has actively expressed the political will to push the resumption of the trilateral 
summit meeting. During the ninth session of the Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum in 
China’s Jiangsu Province, April 21, 2014, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu 
Jianchao said, the Chinese government attaches great importance to the trilateral 
cooperation, and it is willing to work with friendly forces of the ROK and Japan, 
together to enhance understanding and resolve differences in order to inject positive 
energy for the peace, stability and common development of the three countries, and 
even the sub-region of Northeast Asia. 87 
 
China made positive comments on the trilateral summit meeting mechanism, 
emphasizing it is an important way of promoting regional integration. During the fifth 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting, on May 14, 2012, Chinese President Hu Jintao 
said, the trilateral cooperation has become an important platform for the three East 
Asian countries to cement good-neighborly friendship and expand common interests. 88 
During the ninth session of the Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum in China’s Jiangsu 
Province, April 21, 2014, Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao said in an 
interview with Global Times, although the trilateral relationship has experienced ups 
and downs, the overall look of trilateral institutional cooperation is continuous 
development, and also brings important benefits to the peoples of the three countries. 
                                                        
86 People’s Daily, 15 May 2012. 
87 Jianchao Liu, “Speech on the Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum,” online, Xinhua Net, 
22 Apr. 2014; Xinhua Daily Telegraph, 23 April 2014; Yangzhou Daily, 23 April 2014. 
88 People’s Daily, 15 May 2012. 
 65 
He said, from a great regional perspective, the trilateral cooperation is an important 
part of East Asian cooperation, and it is the important driving force of Asian economic 
integration as well. 89 
 
Chinese Prime Minister has attended each trilateral summit meeting both inside and 
outside the framework of 10+3 Summit since the start of the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism in1999. Especially, as the host country, China attached much importance to 
the second China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting in Beijing in 2009, and held the 
Summit Meeting ceremoniously. All long, China has been committed to the 
development process of the trilateral summit meeting, and China has been playing 
more and more important role in the trilateral summit meeting mechanism. 
 
B. URGING JAPAN’S ATTITUDE CHANGE ON HISTORICAL ISSUES 
China indicated Japan is the Crux Barrier of the Trilateral Summit. China made it clear 
that the responsibility lies with part of the leaders of Japan and Japanese government. 
In an interview with Global Times on April 21, 2014, Chinese Assistant Foreign 
Minister Liu Jianchao said implicitly, the leader and the government of one country in 
the three is adopting wrong policy at present, the present dilemma has affected 
people’s feelings, and produced a great impact on the trilateral cooperation, causing 
the decline of Japan’s bilateral trade with China and the ROK. 90 
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China has showed firm stance on historical issues. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
delivered a speech at a memorial ceremony marking the seventy-seventh anniversary 
of the start of the war of resistance against Japanese invasion on seventh July 2014, 
“History is history and facts are facts. Nobody can change history and facts. Anyone 
who intends to deny, distort or beautify history will not find agreement among Chinese 
people and people of all other countries,” President Xi Jinping said, referring to the 
concern that Japan is trying to distort the history of the war. “This minority has 
repeatedly denied or even beautified the history of invasion, undermining mutual trust 
among states and creating regional tensions. Such behavior has been strongly 
condemned by the world’s peace-loving people. History is the best textbook, as well as 
the best dose of sobriety,” said President Xi Jinping, adding that “Chinese people who 
remember the torment of war have always been in pursuit of peace.” 91 
 
China has repeatedly urged Japan to show sincerity and change wrong attitude on 
historical issues, consider the history as a mirror and face the future, and requested 
Japan to properly handle sensitive issues, in order to clear away the obstacles and 
create conditions for the resumption of the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
China has proposed ways and means to solve the immediate obstacles, which is to 
squarely face the problem, conduct dialogue and consultations, and draw lessons from 
history to face the future. Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a speech at Seoul 
National University on July 4, 2014 during his visit to the ROK. He said, “problems 
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can not be avoided, but the answer can be varied; history can not be changed, but the 
future can be shaped.” Meanwhile, he said, “to build consensus through dialogue and 
negotiation, to deal with differences in a amicable spirit, to promote common 
development in the attitude of win-win and cooperation, to solve the real problem in 
the future-oriented vision, is the effective way and reliable protection for the countries 
to live in harmony, and to resolve conflicts and differences, to achieve peace and 
stability in the region.” 92 
 
Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister Liu Jianchao said, “to overcome the current 
obstacles and problems on the trilateral cooperation, the most important entry point is 
the historical issues, namely how the Japanese government deal with the history of the 
war of invasion launched by Japan against other Asian countries. Whether this problem 
can be solved properly will play an important role on the improvement of the trilateral 
cooperation relationship. As long as Japan’s leaders to take correct attitude on the 
issue, the prospects of the trilateral joint cooperation among China, the ROK and Japan 
will still be promising, because it conforms to the historical trend, in line with the 
world’s expectations for the three countries. We hope that Japanese politicians could 
come up with a responsible attitude toward the future, and repair the existing relations 
with China and the ROK.” 93 
 
China has promoted Japan to properly handle the sensitive issues to clear the way for 
the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. Under the current situation, political and 
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security cooperation has lagged behind economic cooperation in Northeast Asia, and 
traditional issues constrain the trilateral summit meeting. But in the long term of the 
trilateral cooperation, the related disputes should not be the obstacles in the present 
and future China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. In order to promote sustainable 
trilateral summit meeting, China has continuously pushed Japan to objectively 
understand the status quo, and make efforts to handle the sensitive issues properly, in 
order to get rid of the obstacles of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. 
 
C. JOINT EFFORTS WITH THE ROK FOR THE RESUMPTION 
Chinese government emphasizes the relationship with the ROK and the role of the 
ROK in the trilateral cooperation mechanism. Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the 
ROK solely in July 2014, which has broken the convention of Chinese diplomacy on 
the Korean Peninsula that Chinese top leader always visits the DPRK before the visit 
to the ROK. During the speech at Seoul National University, President Xi Jinping said, 
“China and the ROK have become genuine strategic cooperative partners and bilateral 
relations are at their best in history, China is willing to become a partner of Korea to 
achieve common development, make joint efforts to regional peace, work to revitalize 
Asia, and promote world prosperity and partnership, so that a broad Asian continent 
and the vast marine become a major platform for China-ROK cooperation.” 94 
 
China and the ROK have common historical and cultural traditions and positive 
identity in Northeast Asia. Under the joint efforts of both sides, there is a high level of 
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strategic mutual trust between China and the ROK both on bilateral and trilateral 
cooperation. China and the ROK have maintained close high-level exchanges, 
established a series of mechanisms for dialogue and communication from the leaders to 
the working-level. The two sides are hand in hand working hard to become partners of 
achieving common development, committing to regional peace and revitalization of 
Asia, and the prosperity of the world. 95 
 
China appropriately deals with the sensitive issues between China and the ROK in 
order to create a good circumstance for the development of China-ROK relations. 
Though there are also some sensitive issues such as the Suyan Islet and other issues 
which could rouse domestic nationalism between China and the ROK, in general there 
is no fundamental conflict of interest and structural contradiction between China and 
the ROK. Chinese government believes that specific issues in China-ROK relations are 
the problems in the process of the development of bilateral relations. 
 
D. PUSHING THE TRILATERAL FTA AS DRIVING FORCE 
In order to restart the trilateral summit meeting as soon as possible, China has actively 
pushed the trilateral FTA to create motivation and good conditions for the trilateral 
summit meeting. Former Chinese Vice Premier, Zeng Peiyan said in the speech at the 
ninth session of the Northeast Asia Trilateral Forum on April 22, 2014, “China, the 
ROK and Japan should prioritize negotiations over their proposed FTA to benefit 
regional economic integration.” He stressed, “This will not only help the three 
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countries to weather international economic risks but also alleviate tensions in political 
and security areas.” 96 
 
The China-ROK-Japan FTA serves the common interests of the three countries, and the 
progress of the trilateral FTA could be the driving force of the China-ROK-Japan 
Summit Meeting. For agricultural and fishery industries, the China-ROK-Japan FTA 
can serve to reform the agricultural sector and prepare the countries for global 
integration in agricultural trade as a good opportunity. For service sectors, the 
liberalization of the services would raise the competitiveness of service sectors by 
improving the competition and quality of services. In addition, since many service 
products are used as intermediary in manufacturing goods, the liberalization of service 
would also improve the competitiveness of manufacturing industries. The trade in 
services among China, the ROK and Japan is becoming increasingly important. Thus, 
the China-ROK-Japan FTA could be used as a means of raising competitiveness in the 
service industries of the three countries, as well as upgrading their economies. 
 
To promote the China-ROK-Japan FTA is faced with difficulties and obstacles, and the 
current progress is not smooth. The establishment of an FTA basically requires tariff 
elimination. All of China, the ROK and Japan have difficulties to meet this 
requirement. The industrial division of labor is not in balance. The ROK and Japan 
have competitive edges in automobile, electronic industry and machine tool industries, 
but they are weak in agricultural and food industries. Agriculture and food processing 
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are sensitive in the ROK and Japan. So the ROK and Japan may worry that they will 
become loser after the China-ROK-Japan FTA because of the openness of agriculture 
and food, which will be opposed by the farmers. China-ROK-Japan FTA negotiations 
have been completed for five rounds until now, but it will take long time to finish all 
the trilateral negotiations because of many interest conflicts among the three 
countries. 97 
 
China is pushing China-ROK FTA as the breakthrough for the China-ROK-Japan FTA. 
The bilateral FTA among the three countries has not been formed yet, undoubtedly, the 
weakness of bilateral FTA among the three countries could give negative effects to 
China-ROK-Japan FTA negotiation. 98  However, compared to China-ROK-Japan 
trilateral FTA, the bilateral FTA is much easier to be promoted. Japan-ROK official 
negotiation for FTA was started in 2003 after several joint studies at different levels for 
three years, but it only continued for six times for about one year, and was suspended 
even without exchanging the offer lists. China-Japan FTA negotiation has not been 
started yet. Compared to Japan-ROK and China-Japan FTA negotiation, China-ROK 
FTA negotiation is more advanced, but it has also experienced a tortuous process. In 
spite of the Joint Research of China-ROK FTA started in 2005, the trilateral FTA 
negotiation was not started until 2012. Twelve rounds of negotiation were finished, and 
the mode negotiation was finished, the substance negotiation was begun. During 
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Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the ROK in July 2014, the two leaders of China 
and the ROK have decided to make joint efforts to complete China-ROK FTA 
negotiations during 2014. 
 
E. MAINTAINING STABILITY ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA 
China’s policy on the Korean Peninsula is clear and continuous, which is to stick to 
solving problems through dialogue and consultation, encouraging the improvement of 
relations between the ROK and the DPRK, supporting the Korean Peninsula to 
eventually realize the independent peaceful reunification. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
said in the speech at Seoul National University on July 4, 2014, “China hopes the 
relationship between the ROK and the DPRK continues to improve. China supports 
peace and reunification on the Korean Peninsula, and the nuclear issue should be 
resolved through dialogue.” 99 
 
China has continuously promoted the Six Party Talks to solve the Korean Peninsula 
nuclear issue. The Six-Party Talks on Korean Peninsula nuclear issue that was initiated 
by China in 2003 is a new diplomatic attempt to solve regional security issue. The 
history proved that the Six-Party Talks participated by major countries within and 
outside the region such as China, the US, the Russian Federation(Russia), the DPRK, 
the ROK and Japan, is the only existing effective mechanism on exploring security 
issues among the relevant countries. It is a creative initiative to solve complex regional 
issues through dialogue and consultation, and is also an effective platform to solve the 
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problem of the Korean Peninsula and achieve lasting peace and stability in Northeast 
Asia. 
 
Since the start of the Six-Party Talks, September 19 (9.19) Joint Statement and other 
important achievements have been reached. The 9.19 Joint Statement not only guided 
the process of the Six-Party Talks and all parties’ actions as a programmatic document, 
but also pointed out the direction for long-term peace and stability in Northeast Asia. 
In 9.19 Joint Statement, the establishment of peace and security mechanism of 
Northeast Asia was explicitly proposed, and the establishment of the working group on 
Northeast Asia peace and security mechanism led by Russia was set up, and it has been 
actively explored for the establishment of this mechanism. 
 
China has pushed the relevant parties to make joint efforts to resume the Six-Party 
Talks as soon as possible. Currently, due to various complicated reasons, the Six-Party 
Talks are suspended. Considering the reality of mutual trust deficit among the 
countries in Northeast Asia area, to gradually promote the construction of a regional 
multilateral peace and security mechanism based on the Six-Party Talks, is the easiest 
and viable option that can be achieved by all the relevant parties and all the parties’ 
interests can be taken into account. China has actively explored to establish Northeast 
Asian peace and security mechanism. Under the principle of consensus, the mechanism 
construction can be promoted by the spirit of easy issues first and guided by the 
principle of gradual and orderly progressing step by step. The Six-Party Talks can 
become the incubator of Northeast Asian peace and security mechanism, and Northeast 
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Asian peace and security mechanism can be an early or mid harvest result in the 
Six-Party Talks. 100 
 
F. EFFORTS TO ELIMINATE NEIGHBORS’ DOUBTS ON CHINA’S RISE 
The Chinese government has proposed the strategy of peaceful development and 
harmonious world, advocated a new security concept of mutual trust, mutual benefit, 
equality and cooperation, and further proposed a new concept of Asian security of 
which core contents are common security, comprehensive security, cooperative 
security and sustainable security. 
 
China’s rise will continue to have enormous political and strategic effect in Northeast 
Asia and throughout the world, and the doubt and uneasiness of other countries 
especially the neighboring countries toward China’s rise will exist for quite a long 
time. Faceing with this reality, China got to realize all possible realistic and 
psychological impacts that its rise may bring to other countries. 101  In the 
implementation of its Northeast Asian strategy and promoting sub-regional cooperation 
mechanism including the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting, China strives to 
minimize the impacts of its rising as far as possible, and reduce the pressures from the 
regional countries, and eliminate the worries and anxieties that its rising objectively 
brings to Japan, the ROK through various means. 
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China repeatedly emphasized that China adheres to the road of peaceful development, 
and completely abandon the road of hegemony and expansion which big powerful 
countries have always sought on bilateral and multilateral, regional and international 
arena in the history. Chinese President Xi Jinping refuted the notion that China is a 
threat to the region, he said, “China will always be a country that maintains peace, 
promotes cooperation, and is open-minded to learn from others.” President Xi Jinping 
also called for “building an open, merging, and developing community in Asia.” 102 
 
Facing the cold bilateral political relations between China and Japan, China pushed 
forward Japan to accept China’s peaceful rise and seek win-win cooperation with 
China. China made efforts to increase national friendship between China and Japan by 
civil and personal exchanges which could actively promote the political relations 
between China and Japan. 
 
China emphasized to Japan that, the Sino-Japanese friendship is the trend of the times. 
For China and Japan, no matter how the world changes, no matter how the other 
developed, regardless of the will of each other, the two adjacent location can not be 
changed, its huge impact on the peace and security of Northeast Asia can not be 
changed, the interdependence of two economies in the region can not be changed. How 
to resolve the historical grudges and establish a new framework in line with the 
twenty-first century is an important issue lies in front of China and Japan. 
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China seeks to appropriately handle US factors on the trilateral cooperation. In the 
background of China’s increasing economic and comprehensive national strength, the 
US doubts on China’s rise are also increasing, and the US has deep distrust on the 
future development of China. 103 Especially since the American Neo-Conservativism 
entered the political arena, the Cold War mentality of making alliances through values 
and seeking unilateral security through military force balance has become popular 
again, which has made many contradictions faced by other countries unresolved, but 
immobilized and enhanced constantly. This caused great obstacles to regional security 
cooperation, and is not conducive to the lasting peace and sustainable development in 
the region. 
 
China-US relations have global significance in today’s world. China fully assesses the 
effects of its rise to the US,and its realistic interests in the region, and fully 
understands the regional and international influence of maintaining good China-US 
relations. In order to properly handle American factors, China carries out active 
interactions with U.S. in the process of regional cooperation. This is helpful for China 
to optimize its foreign strategy, and construct Northeast Asian strategy which is both in 
line with China’s strategic needs and today’s international relations in Northeast Asia. 
                                                        
103 Xiaoming Zhang, “The US’s Role in East Asian Regionalization: A Hinder or a 





As Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye have said, “We live in an era of 
interdependence.” 104 The close economic interdependence among China, the ROK and 
Japan promoted the rise of the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. Since the trilateral 
summit meeting mechanism was established in 1999, after fifteen years of 
development, great achievements have been made, and under the impetus of the leader 
level mechanism of the trilateral summit meeting, all of China, the ROK and Japan 
have benefited from the trilateral cooperation mechanism. 
 
Like marriage, in international cooperation, enjoying the benefits of closer 
international economic relations comes at the expense of giving up a certain degree of 
autonomy of the country. There are also high costs on the trilateral interdependence 
among China, the ROK and Japan, resulting sensitivity and vulnerability of 
interdependence. Currently, there are some difficulties and obstacles on the trilateral 
summit meeting, which requires concessions of all the three countries. 
 
Relying on its unique advantage, with the increasing influence in the region and all 
over the world, China could play a significant role to enable the trilateral summit 
meeting mechanism to overcome the obstacles and restart the trilateral summit 
meeting. On promoting long-term trilateral cooperation, objectively China should face 
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the reality of geopolitical region, and avoid the competition for leadership with Japan 
in the framework of China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting, and continue to play the role 
as a good facilitator, coordinator, and builder, uphold the principle of mutual benefit 
and concept of win-win outcome, sharing its development opportunities and common 
interests with the ROK and Japan, so that the common prosperities of all the three 
countries in the region could be promoted, and the peoples of the three countries could 
live a happier life. 
 
In today’s world of globalization, the China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting mechanism 
corresponds with the international trend, and it could benefit the three countries and 
the peoples. To overcome the current difficulties to reopen the China-ROK-Japan 
Summit Meeting, all the three countries should make joint efforts: 
 
Firstly, China, the ROK and Japan should abandon the Cold War mentality and 
zero-sum thinking, and promote the construction of security mechanism in Northeast 
Asia. Peace and development are the two major themes in today’s world. The three 
countries should always view the maintenance of regional peace and stability as a 
starting point, consider the economic developments and achievements as well as 
mutual benefits of the countries in the region as the fundamental policy objectives, and 
establish a new security concept that is based on equality and trust, cooperation and 
win-win, and strive to create a harmonious order, and make joint efforts for lasting 
peace, security and prosperity in Northeast Asia, in order to benefit all the three 
countries and make contribution to Asia and the world. 
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Secondly, China, the ROK and Japan should properly handle sensitive issues and 
promote mutual trust and understanding. The three countries should set their overall 
interests on top of sensitive issues such as territorial issues, historical issues, 
enhancing mutual trust and deepening mutual understanding through dialogue, and 
jointly seek the proper way to a peaceful solution on the issues, and all of them should 
give more tolerance to each other on various disputes. The three countries could set 
aside the disputes first before they can find an acceptable solution together. 
 
Thirdly, the three countries should promote practical trilateral cooperation in various 
fields, from the shallower to the deeper. The non-traditional security cooperation not 
only conforms to the trend of globalization, but also has significant “spillover” effects, 
and makes up for the shortcomings of traditional security cooperation. So the three 
countries could start cooperation from anti-terrorism, combating cross-border crimes, 
environmental protection, nuclear safety and natural disaster prevention, maritime 
relief, public health and food safety and other non-traditional security issues, from the 
easy issues to the difficult ones. Also, the three countries should strengthen the 
guidance and nurturing of national feelings by more extensive civil and personnel 
exchanges, in order to create good environment for the trilateral summit meeting. 
 
Fourthly, the three countries should perfectionalize the institutional construction. The 
trilateral cooperation secretariat (TCS) should play a significant role in promoting 
China-ROK-Japan Summit Meeting. Currently, TCS is still in the initial stage. Due to 
the technical reasons such as limited scale of institutions, inadequate staffing and the 
lack of political authority, TCS does not have sufficient policy incentives to play a role 
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in coordination of the trilateral summit meeting. The three countries should give more 
political authority to TCS to improve its political status. For example, TCS could 
regularly promote official’s meetings, such as foreign minister level meetings, or 
academic conferences to enhance mutual trust and understanding, and reduce the 
restriction factors of the trilateral summit meeting, and help the three governments to 
unload more political burden. Meanwhile, the function of TCS needs to be 
strengthened, the internal sector needs to be future improved, and the scale of staff 
needs to be enlarged, in order to meet the need of the trilateral summit meeting 
mechanism. 
 
Fifthly, the trilateral summit meeting mechanism could attract broad participation of 
the regional countries including the DPRK, Mongolia, Russia and the extraterritorial 
countries such as the US, ASEAN and other countries and international organizations, 
in order to ease the external resistance and gain more motivation. The three countries 
should actively conduct dialogue of the trilateral summit meeting mechanism with 
other international organizations, in order to maintain peace and stability of internal 
and external environment by the in-depth dialogue and policy coordination in security 
field, and seek to achieve a common, comprehensive, cooperative, sustainable security 
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